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Among the most studied tasks in Quantum Cryptography one can find Bit Commitment (BC)
and Oblivious Transfer (OT), two central cryptographic primitives. In this paper we propose for
the first time protocols for these tasks in the measurement-device independent (MDI) settings and
analyze their security. We analyze two different cases: first we assume the parties have access to
perfect single photon sources (but still in the presence of noise and losses), and second we assume
that they only have imperfect single photon sources. In the first case we propose a protocol for
both BC and OT and prove their security in the Noisy Quantum Storage model. Interestingly, in
the case where honest parties do not have access to perfect single photon sources, we find that BC
is still possible, but that it is “more difficult” to get a secure protocol for OT: We show that there
is a whole class of protocols that cannot be secure. All our security analyses are done in the finite
round regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Oblivious Transfer (OT) – [Rab81] – and Bit Commitment (BC) –[GMW91, Nao89, CDVdG87] – are two central,
and well studied cryptographic primitives. In fact it has been shown that OT is universal [Kil88] in the sense that
all two-partite secure function evaluation tasks can be reduced to OT. This means that if one is given a secure
implementation of OT, one can construct a protocol using OT (and classical communications) that implements any
secure function evaluation protocol.
OT and BC are related to each other. In particular since OT is universal, it is possible to implement BC given
an OT routine. The converse is not true if we limit the parties to classical communication [MN05]. However if the
parties have access to quantum communication it can be shown that OT can be reduced to BC [BBCS92, FS09], and
therefore OT and BC are equivalent in the quantum settings.
Unfortunately it is now well known that neither OT nor BC can be implemented when no restriction (other than
following the laws of (quantum) physics) is made on the power of the adversary [May97, LC97, LC98]. This motivated
the search for realistic assumptions that could be made on the adversary’s power.
Inspired by the classical Bounded Storage Model [Mau92], Ref. [DFSS05] proposed protocols assuming that the
adversary can only store a limited amount of qubits, i.e. that the quantum memory of the adversary is bounded. The
assumption is called the Bounded Quantum Storage Model. Note that the Bounded Quantum Storage Model has the
advantage over computational assumptions that it allows for everlasting security, meaning that the assumption only
needs to be satisfied during the execution of the protocol. No additional resources or power gained after the execution
of the protocol can allow the adversary to break security. This contrasts with computational assumption for which
giving more computational power to the adversary after the execution of the protocol is a threat to the security of
the protocol. The Bounded Quantum Storage Model – as well as the more general Noisy Quantum Storage Model –
allows to prove the security of protocols for OT and BC [DFSS05, DFSS07, WCSL10, KWW12, NJC+12, ENG+14].
However, these security proofs rely implicitly on the assumption that the devices used by the honest parties are
sufficiently well characterized and will always work as expected. This assumption might not always be satisfied in
practice. In particular, in the context of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), attacks performed by tampering with
the measurement devices exist [MAS06, SRK+15].
In the context of quantum key distribution, in order to present protocols that are not subject to these types of
attack, Refs. [MY98, ABG+07, PAB+09] propose a security proof that is independent of the inner working of the
quantum devices used during the protocol. In fact the devices are considered as black boxes, and the security only
relies on the ability of the devices to demonstrate certain “non-local” statistics for their inputs and outputs. More
precisely the authors show that if the devices are able to violate the CHSH inequality [CHSH69] then there is a secure
protocol for quantum key distribution. This result has been later generalized to include a more powerful adversary
[VV14, MS17, MS16, AFDF+18, RMW18]. The model in which the devices are considered as black boxes is called
device independence.
Following this idea of device independence Refs. [KW16, RTK+18] proved security of BC and OT in the
bounded/noisy quantum storage model in device independent settings. However it is important to note that the
authors assume that, even if the devices may behave in an arbitrary way, they do so in the same fashion in every
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2use of the devices independently of the past. In other words they assume that the devices are memoryless. Other
protocols [AMPS16, SCA+11] are secure against a more powerful adversary but require different settings where they
only achieve an imperfect bit commitment scheme. In general it is quite hard to prove device independent security of
protocols. In particular there is no known security proof for device independent OT and BC in the settings presented
in Refs. [KW16, RTK+18] without the memoryless assumption. Experimental implementations of device independent
protocols are also a lot more demanding as discussed in Ref. [MvR+18] for quantum key distribution. In fact it is so
demanding that, while many quantum key distribution and some (quantum) BC protocols have been implemented,
there has not been any device independent implementation of these protocols so far, not even assuming that the
devices are memoryless.
These difficulties together with the fact that many attacks on the non device independent protocols [MAS06,
SRK+15] are tampering with the measurement devices and not with the photon sources (or quantum state sources), has
led Refs.[LCQ12] to introduce a weaker but more practical notion of device independence called measurement-device
independence (MDI). Here only the measurement devices are treated as black boxes, not the sources of photons (states)
that are still trusted. Since then many measurement-device independent protocols have been implemented [LCW+13,
POS+15, TLX+14, TYC+14, FdSVX+13] for QKD. Typically, in a measurement-device independent protocol, all the
measurement devices are in a measurement station in between the parties (see Fig. 1). Having the measurement
station in between the two parties is very natural if one considers that it is part of the network infrastructure also
used for QKD. The parties will send BB84 type states to the measurement station which will perform a joint Bell
measurement on the incoming qubits. As there is no assumption on these devices we will here always assume that
the dishonest party can control the station (see Fig. 2a2b). This situation is different from MDI QKD, where the
dishonest party is always a third party who only controls the measurement station, but never the sources of Alice and
Bob. In particular, in QKD, Alice and Bob can always trust each other, which is not the case for BC or OT.
Alice Bob
Measurement
Station
|Ψ〉 |Ψ′〉
Figure 1: Schematic of a MDI protocol.
However, almost all the work on measurement-device independence is focused on quantum key distribution [LCQ12,
LCW+13, POS+15, TLX+14, TYC+14], and as far as we know there is no proposed protocol for BC or OT in the
measurement-device independent settings. In this work we present protocols for BC and OT and analyze their security.
Importantly, all our security proofs hold in the finite rounds regime and can be implemented with current state-of-the-
art quantum technologies. We first analyze the situation where the honest parties have perfect single photon sources.
Interestingly, in the case where honest parties do not have access to perfect single photon sources, we find that BC
is still possible, but that it is “more difficult” to get a secure protocol for OT: We show that there is a whole class of
protocols that cannot be secure. We present in the next section a detailed overview of our results.
1. Notation
In this paper we will denote quantum states by the Greek letters ρ, σ. For the purpose of this analysis quantum
states can be taken to be positive linear operators of trace equal to 1 acting on a Hilbert space. We use the ket
notation (e.g. |Ψ〉) to denote pure quantum states. Quantum measurements are described by Positive Operator
Valued Measures (POVMs) which are finite sets of positive operators that sum up to the identity, e.g. {Px, x ∈ X :
Px ≥ 0 &
∑
x Px = 1}, where X is a finite set of indices. If for some measurement the operators Px are mutually
orthogonal projectors, then we say that the measurement is projective. The probability of observing outcome x ∈ X
when measuring the state ρ with the measurement described by {Px}x∈X is given by px := tr(Pxρ). We use Xnj as
a shorthand for the string Xj , . . . , Xn (j ≤ n). The symbol ≈ will be used to express that two states are -close in
the trace distance (e.g. σ ≈ ρ for two states ρ, σ). In several occasions we will denote R for a family (not necessarily
specified) of 2-universal hash functions. We will use X ∈R E to say that X is picked uniformly at random from set E .
3Alice Bob
Measurement
Station
(a) Schematic of an MDI protocol with dishonest Alice.
Alice has control over the measurement station,
therefore we will treat Alice and the measurement
station as one party.
Alice Bob
Measurement
Station
(b) Schematic of an MDI protocol with dishonest Bob.
Bob has control over the measurement station, therefore
we will treat Bob and the measurement station as one
party.
Figure 2: Schematic MDI protocol with dishonest Alice or dishonest Bob.
[n] is a shorthand notation for {1, . . . , n}.
II. RESULTS
In this section, we will present the results of our work. Formal statements and their proofs will be given in the
Methods Section.
• We start by presenting the MDI protocols for OT and BC for the case where the honest parties have access to
perfect single photon sources.
• Then we present and analyze the security of a protocol for BC where the honest parties only have imperfect
single photon sources, i.e. multiphoton emissions are possible.
• Finally we show that there is a family of protocols that cannot be secure for OT in MDI settings when the
honest parties are using imperfect single photon sources.
A. Bit Commitment (BC) with perfect single photon sources
In this section we explain Bit Commitment, present a protocol that implements it when the honest parties have
access to a perfect single photon source (Protocol II.1), and state the security of this protocol in the Noisy Quantum
Storage Model.
Bit Commitment is a two-phase task between two parties, Alice and Bob, where in the first phase Alice commits
to a bit of her choice to Bob. Later they can run the second phase (the “Open” phase) where Alice reveals the bit
to which she committed. Importantly, Alice should not be able to open a bit different than the one to which she
committed. Also we require that Bob cannot learn the value of the committed bit before Alice opens it. The case in
which Alice commits to a bit-string rather than a single bit is called String Commitment. In the following we give
a formal definition for a randomized version of String Commitment, where Alice does not get to choose the string
she commits to. This string will be produced uniformly at random by the protocol. Note that a Randomized String
Commitment can be turned into a String Commitment scheme as explained in [KWW12].
In this paper we will use the security definition of Bit Commitment from [KWW12] informally stated below. The
reader can find the formal Definition C.1 in Appendix C.
Definition II.1 (Randomized String Commitment (informal)).
A protocol implements an (l, )-Randomized String Commitment if it satisfies the following three conditions:
Correctness: If both Alice and Bob are honest, the protocol outputs a classical state ρCl1Cl1F such that ρCl1F is -close
to τCl1 ⊗ |accept〉〈accept|F , where τCl1 := 12l is maximally mixed and Cl1 is an l-bit-string.
4Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then there exists a string Cl1 after the Commit phase, such that the probability
that Alice opens to another string Cl1
′ 6= Cl1, and Bob accepts is smaller than .
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then after the Commit phase and before the Open phase Bob is “-ignorant”
about the string Cl1 that Alice has received during the Commit phase.
BobAlice Commit
Cl1 ∈R {0, 1}l “Committed”
BobAlice Open
“Open” Cl1
Figure 3: Ideal Randomized String Commitment. In the first part Alice gets a random l-bit string Cl1 ∈ {0, 1}l,
and Bob is notified that the string is committed. In the second phase, Alice asks “the box” to reveal the string
to Bob.
In this work we show that the protocol below implements a secure String Commitment scheme.
Theorem (Security of Protocol II.1 (Informal)). Let 0 <  < 1, let l be the length of the string to be committed, let
eerr be the expected error rate between the outcomes of honest Alice and honest Bob in the preparation phase of the
protocol II.1, and let D be an upper-bound on the size of dishonest Bob’s quantum memory expressed in qubits. If
honest players have access to perfect single photon sources, then Protocol II.1 implements an (l, 3)−Randomized String
Commitment according to the above definition. In particular it does so using n rounds of quantum communication,
where n is a positive integer solution to (λ− h(δ))n ≥ l + 2 log(1/2) + ln(−1), where λ := f(−D/n) − 1/n (f is
defined in eq. (1)), and δ = 2eerr + 2α2, where α2 is a term that accounts for statistical fluctuations α2 = O(n−1/2).
The reader can find a formal version of this theorem in the Methods Section together with its proof, see Theorem IV.6.
Intuitively – in the MDI settings with perfect single photon sources – the only difference for the security analysis as
compare to the analysis of the protocols presented in Refs. [KWW12, NJC+12] is that honest Bob sends information
to malicious Alice. However since we are guarantied (by assumption) that Bob sends BB84 states on single photons,
we can use a purification argument in order to reduce the MDI situation to the one of Refs. [KWW12, NJC+12] (see
Figure 7) where only Alice sends information to Bob.
Remark II.1 (Bell measurement). In the MDI protocols we will describe in this paper we use measurements that we
call “Bell measurement”. Usually the terminology “Bell measurement” designates a two-qubits-projective measurement
described by the four projections onto the Bell states XaZb |00〉+|11〉√
2
, (a, b) ∈ {0, 1}2, where X and Z denote the
Pauli X and Z operators. In general, a measurement whose operators are projections onto four orthogonal maximally
entangled state is called a “deterministic Bell measurement”. However, in this paper the expression “Bell measurement”
refers to a more general type of measurements sometimes called “probabilistic Bell measurements”. A probabilistic Bell
measurement is a two-qubit measurement where one or two of its operators are projections onto orthogonal maximally
entangled states, the other operators being arbitrary (on the condition that the set of operators considered describes a
valid measurement). The outcomes corresponding to operators that are not projections onto maximally entanglement
states will be considered as ‘failure” outcomes. This notion of probabilistic Bell measurement arises naturally when
considering linear optical implementation of such measurements. Indeed linear optics does not allow to implement
deterministic Bell measurements [CL01].
Furthermore, it is sometimes possible to detect when the qubits were lost before reaching the measurement device. This
will also be considered as a “failure” outcome. The overall probability of obtaining a failure outcome is denoted pfail.
We present below a protocol for Randomized String Commitment adapted from [KWW12] to the measurement-
device-independent case. In this protocol Alice and Bob will start with a preparation phase in which they send n states
randomly chosen from the set {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} to the measurement station which will perform a Bell measurement
on these qubits and broadcast the outcome. For the rounds in which Alice and Bob have used the same basis to
encode their states, the Bell measurement outcome tells Bob whether he has encoded the same bit as Alice in his
qubit or the opposite bit. If they have used a different basis then the Bell measurement outcome does not give any
information on their correlation. In order to force any dishonest party to store quantum information, both parties
will wait a certain time ∆t before Alice reveals to Bob which bases she has used to prepare her qubits. This allows
5Bob to compute the set of rounds I ⊆ [n] where they have used the same bases. Bob will discard the rounds that do
not belong to I. From there, they will only use classical communication to extract a random committed string Cl1 in
the Commit phase, and to reveal this string in the Open phase.
For the following protocol, we will use a randomly generated [n, k, d]-linear code C ⊆ {0, 1}n with fixed rate
R := k/n to describe Protocol II.1 and to analyze its security. This does not affect the efficiency of the protocol since
the honest parties do not need to decode: We only need to use this code to impose that two strings with the same
syndrome have Hamming distance at least d. We denote Syn : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}n−k for the function that outputs the
parity-check syndrome of the code C. In this protocol we use the two following shorthand notations α1 :=
√
ln −1
2n ,
α2 :=
√
ln −1
2(1/2−α1)n . Let f(·) be the function defined as follows.
f(x) :=

0 if x < −1
g−1(x) if − 1 ≤ x < 1/2
x if 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1,
(1)
where g(x) := h(x) + x− 1 and h(x) := −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary entropy.
Protocol II.1 (Randomized String Commitment).
Inputs: security parameter  > 0, length of the committed string l > 0, bound on the size of the adversary’s
quantum memory D, eerr is the expected error rate that should be observed between Alice’s an Bob strings XI and
XˆI (see below).
Preparation phase:
Choose the number n of rounds that click, such that n ≥ l+2 log(1/2)+ln(−1)λ−h(δ) , where λ := f(−D/n) − 1/n,
and δ = 2eerr + 2α2.
1. For round i (until the number of rounds in which the measurement station has clicked is higher than
n):
• Alice chooses Xi ∈R {0, 1} and Θi ∈R {0, 1} uniformly at random, and prepares and sends the
state |Xi〉Θi (where |0〉0 := |0〉, |1〉0 := |1〉, |0〉1 := |+〉, |1〉1 := |−〉) to the measurement station.
• Bob chooses Xˆi ∈R {0, 1} and Θˆi ∈R {0, 1} uniformly at random and prepares and sends the state
|Xˆi〉Θˆi (where |0〉0 := |0〉, |1〉0 := |1〉, |0〉1 := |+〉, |1〉1 := |−〉) to the measurement station.
• The measurement station performs a Bell measurement on the two states it receives, and broadcasts
the outcome, or whether the measurement failed (see Remark II.1). Depending on the outcome,
Bob chooses whether he should flip his bit or not.
2. Alice and Bob discard all the rounds where a failure has been announced. Let’s call n the remaining
number of rounds. Alice has strings Xn1 and Θn1 ∈ {0, 1}n, and Bob has strings Xˆn1 and Θˆn1 ∈ {0, 1}n.
3. Both parties wait for a time ∆t.
4. Alice sends Θn1 over to Bob.
5. Bob computes the set I ⊆ [n] of rounds i where Θi = Θˆi. Bob discards all the rounds j /∈ I. Let’s then
call XˆI the string formed by all the remaining bits Xˆi with i ∈ I.
Note that when there is no noise we have that ∀i ∈ I Xi = Xˆi. In practice there are always errors: We
will call eerr the expected error rate between Xi and Xˆi (for i ∈ I), in other words eerr is the expected
fraction of error between XI and XˆI .
Commit Phase:
1. Bob checks whether m := |I| ≥ 1/2 · n− α1. If it is not the case Bob aborts the protocol.
2. Alice chooses a random [n, k, d]-linear code C (for fixed n and k) and computes w = Syn(Xn1 ) and sends
it to Bob.
3. Alice picks a random 2-universal hash function r ∈R R and sends it to Bob.
64. Alice outputs Cl1 := Ext(Xn1 , r) where Ext(·, ·) is a randomness extractor from the 2-universal family
of functions.
Open phase:
1. Alice sends Xn1 to Bob.
2. Bob computes its syndrome and checks if it agrees with w he received from Alice in the Commit phase.
If they disagree Bob aborts the protocol.
3. Bob checks that the number of rounds i ∈ I where Xn1 and XˆI do not agree lies in the interval
]eerr − α2, eerr + α2[. If not, Bob aborts the protocol, otherwise Bob accepts, and he outputs Cl1 :=
Ext(Xn1 , r) where Ext(·, ·) is a randomness extractor from the 2-universal family of function.
In order to satisfy the security definition for Randomized String Commitment, when the protocol aborts, the honest
parties will continue the protocol as if they were not aborting – in particular they do not announce the abort event
until the end of the protocol – and in the end honest Bob always rejects the commitment and output a uniformly
random value to C˜l1, and honest Alice outputs a uniformly random value for Cl1.
B. Oblivious Transfer (OT) with perfect single photon sources
In this section we explain OT, present a protocol that implements it when the honest parties have access to a
perfect single photon source (Protocol II.2), and we state the security of this protocol in the Bounded Quantum
Storage Model.
BobAlice OT
(S0, S1) (SC , C)
Figure 4: In a Randomized 1-out-2 Oblivious String Transfer, Alice should get two random l-bit strings (S0, S1)
and Bob should receive a random bit C together with SC which is one of the two strings Alice has received. Alice
should never learn C and Bob should remain ignorant about at least one of the two bit-strings Alice receives.
OT, or rather its variant called Randomized 1-out-2 Oblivious String Transfer, is a task where Alice receives two
random strings (S0, S1), and Bob receives one of this string SC together with its corresponding index C (see Fig. 4).
We will use the definition of the Randomized 1-out-2 Oblivious String Transfer from [KWW12] which is informally
stated below. The reader can find the formal Definition C.2 in Appendix C
Definition II.2 (Randomized String Transfer (informal)). A protocol implements an (l, )-Randomized 1-out-2 Obliv-
ious String Transfer if it satisfies the following three conditions:
Correctness: If Alice and Bob are honest the protocol’s output state ρ(S0,S1),(SC ,C) is such that the reduced state
ρS0,S1,C is -close to τS0 ⊗ τS1 ⊗ τC , where τR denotes the maximally mixed state on register R, and S0, S1 are
two l-bit-strings.
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then Alice should get two l-bit-strings S0 and S1 such that there exists a
binary random variable C˜ such that Bob is “-ignorant” about the bit string S1−C˜ . We say that the protocol is
−hiding.
Security for Bob: If Bob is honest then he should receive a random bit C and an l-bit-string SˆC , such that Alice is
“-ignorant” about C. We say that the protocol is −binding.
In this work we show that Protocol II.2 presented below implements a secure Randomized Oblivious Transfer.
Theorem (Randomized 1-out-2 OT (Informal)). Let 0 <  < 1, let l > 0 be an integer, let eerr ∈]0, 1/2[ be the
expected error rate between the outcomes of honest Alice and honest Bob in the preparation phase of Protocol II.2, and
let D be an upper-bound on the size of dishonest Bob’s quantum memory expressed in qubits. When honest parties
have access to perfect single photon sources, Protocol II.2 implements an (l, )-Randomized 1-out-2 Oblivious String
Transfer according to the above definition in the Bounded Quantum Storage Model. In particular it does so using a
7linear (in the length l of Alice’s strings |S0| = |S1| = l) number of rounds of quantum communication. More precisely,
the number n of quantum communication rounds must satisfy n ≥ 2 l+D+1−2 log(1−
√
1−2)
λ−h(eerr)−O(n−1/2) , where λ := 1/2 − δ′ with
δ′ = (2− log(√(32 ln −1)/n))√(32 ln −1)/n
The reader can find a formal version of this theorem in the Methods Section together with its proof, see Theorem
IV.11. Intuitively – in the MDI settings with perfect single photon source – using a purification argument on the
states sent by Bob, we can essentially reduce the security proof of our protocol to the security proofs of the trusted
device protocol presented in Ref. [KWW12] in which all devices are trusted. However we need to be careful because
we also want to take into account noise which has not been done in Ref. [KWW12].
The protocol presented below is also adapted from [KWW12]. For the following Protocol, let α1 :=
√
ln −1
2n be a
term accounting for statistical fluctuations.
Protocol II.2 (Randomized 1-out-2 OT).
Inputs: security parameter  > 0, the length l of the strings Alice receives, the bound (expressed in qubits) on
the adversaries memory D, expected error rate eerr between Alice’s and Bob’s strings XI and XˆI defined below.
Preparation phase: They first choose the number of rounds n in which the station clicks, such that n ≥
2 l+D+1−2 log(1−
√
1−2)
λ−h(eerr)−O(n−1/2) . Then Alice and Bob do the same as in the preparation phase of Protocol II.1.
At this point Alice has a string Xn1 , and Bob has a string XˆI and the set I ⊆ [n].
Post Processing:
1. Bob checks whether |I| ≥ (1/2 − α1)n =: m. If this is the case he randomly truncates I such that
|I| = m. Otherwise he aborts.
2. Bob picks a random subset of Ic of size m called IBad. Bob chooses a bit C uniformly at random. He
then renames (I, IBad) into (IC , I1−C). Bob sends (I0, I1) to Alice.
3. Alice sends Bob error correction information for the strings XI0 and XI1 .
4. Bob uses the error correction information O to correct his string XˆI .
5. Alice chooses two 2-universal hash functions r0, r1 ∈R R uniformly at random and sends them to Bob.
6. Alice outputs (S0, S1) :=
(
Ext(XI0 , r0),Ext(XI1 , r1)
)
, and Bob outputs (SˆC , C) :=
(
Ext(XIC , rC), C
)
.
In order to satisfy the security definition for OT, when an honest party aborts the protocol, the aborting party will
continue the protocol as if they were not aborting – in particular, they do not announce the abort event until the
end of the protocol – except that in the end, when the abort event is announced all honest parties assign to their
outputs uniformly random values.
C. Bit Commitment with imperfect single photon sources
In this section we present a protocol that implements String Commitment when the honest parties do not have
access to perfect single photon sources (Protocol II.3), and we state the security of this protocol in the Noisy Quan-
tum Storage Model. In this situation, the multiphoton emissions can leak – to dishonest Alice – information about
the bases Bob used in his encoding. As a consequence, malicious Alice could take advantage of that by selectively
announcing all single photon emissions as “lost”, and keep only the rounds where she has information on the bases
used by Bob. Malicious Bob can do the same to get some advantage over honest Alice. To prevent this, and make
sure that most of the rounds that are kept in the end correspond to single photon emission rounds we will use the
decoy states technique [LMC05] similar to [WCSL10]. This will allow the honest party to estimate an upper-bound
on the number of rounds that are kept in the end and which correspond to multiphoton emissions.
Examples of photon sources are lasers. They produce coherent states that can be written in the Fock basis as
8follows:
|α〉 = e− |α|
2
2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉, (2)
where |n〉 is the photon number eigenstate associated to photon number n, and α ∈ C. The intensity is the average
number of photons of such a state, and is given by |α|2. As in some MDI QKD experiments [LCQ12, LCW+13,
TLX+14] one can use a randomized phase coherent state in order to turn the laser into an imperfect single photon
source [WCSL10]. A randomized phase coherent state is a coherent state where α = reiφ with r > 0 and where φ
is chosen uniformly at random in [0, 2pi[. To anyone that does not know which phase has been picked, this state is
equivalent to the mixed state ρ|α|2 =
∑∞
n=0 e
−|α|2 |α|2n
n! |n〉〈n|. When one wants to produce single photons, one can
use an attenuated laser that produces states with a low average number of photon, i.e. with small |α|2. For example
for |α|2 = 0.1, the state ρ|α|2 is essentially a mixture of |0〉〈0| with probability ≈ 0.905, |1〉〈1| with probability
p1 ≈ 0.0905, and multiphoton emissions with probability p≥2 ≈ 0.0045, which gives a fraction of ≈ 5% of multiphoton
emissions conditioned on emitting at least one photon, which means that the source mostly (95% of non 0 emissions)
emits single photons and and emits a small amount of multiphoton states (about 5% of non 0 photon emissions). In
a protocol like MDI BC we encode the state in some degree of freedom like polarization. This is a problem for the
rounds where multiple photons have been emitted. When only one photon is emitted the possible states Bob can
encode are {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}, and therefore the state sent from Bob to Alice conditioned on a choice of basis, θ = 0
or θ = 1 are ρ|θ=0 = 1/2(|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|) = 1/2 = 1/2(|+〉〈+| + |−〉〈−|) = ρ|θ=1, meaning that Alice cannot guess
which basis Bob has used to encode his state. On the contrary, if for example two photons have been emitted the
states are ρ|θ=0 = 1/2(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|) 6= 1/2(|++〉〈++ |+ | −−〉〈−− |) = ρ|θ=1 meaning that Alice can guess the
basis used with non 0 advantage. This is a problem since security against dishonest Alice relies on her being ignorant
about Bob’s basis information. In particular we want to avoid the case where dishonest Alice measures the photon
number of the incoming state from Bob, and chooses to announce failure only if she receives single photon. This is
why we use decoy states: They will allow us to estimate how many single photon rounds have been reported as failure.
For BC in the case where honest parties use imperfect single photon sources, Protocol II.3 can be used. The
main difference as compare to Protocol II.1 is the use of q additional decoy states in the “Preparation phase”. Alice
(Bob) can use different intensities1 for the state she (he) sends. Among these intensities one will correspond to the
“signal” state and will be denoted as (bs), while the others will be the “decoy” states with intensities a ∈ {ad1 . . . adq}
(b ∈ {bd1 . . . bdq}). In Protocol II.3 we will call nA1 +nA≥2 (nB1 +nB≥2) the number of rounds where Alice (Bob) has used
a “signal” state – i.e. a state with intensity as (bs) – and where the measurement station reported the measurement as
successful. nA1 (nB1 ) is the number of these states where Alice (Bob) has sent 1 photon, and nA≥2 (n
B
≥2) is the number
of these rounds where Alice (Bob) has sent ≥ 2 photons. Note that at the end of Step 1 of the “preparation phase”,
and because we do not consider dark counts in this work, Alice (Bob) knows the value of nA1 + nA≥2 (n
B
1 + n
B
≥2).
However even if she (he) knows the sum nA1 + nA≥2 (n
B
1 + n
B
≥2), she (he) does not know the individual terms n
A
1
(nA1 ) and nA≥2 (n
B
≥2) of this sum. Alice (Bob) will only be able to estimate a lower-bound LA1 (LB1) on n
A
1 (nB1 ) by
using the decoy states. Since nA1 + nA≥2 (n
B
1 + n
B
≥2) is known to Alice (Bob), this lower-bound gives automatically an
upper-bound UA2 = nA1 + nA≥2 − LA1 (UB2 = nB1 + nB≥2 − LB1) on nA≥2 (nB≥2).
In the following we will write pa (pb) for the probability that Alice (Bob) prepares a signal of intensity a ∈
{as, ad1 . . . adq} (b ∈ {bas , bd1 . . . bdq}). When the identity of the emitter is not determined, the intensity will be
denoted i (meaning that i = a is the emitter is Alice or i = b is the emitter is Bob). The probability that an emitter
emits k photons will be denoted pk (e.g. if k = 1 then we will write p1 etc.). The probability that the emitter emits
more than k photons will be denoted p≥k (e.g. p≥2). We will also mix the two above notations when talking about
conditional events. For example, the probability that Alice emits 2 photons conditioned on choosing signal intensity
a will be denoted p2|a.
In this paper we show that Protocol II.3 below is secure, in particular we show the following. Here we state this
lemma in the case in which Alice is honest. A similar statement would apply for honest Bob.
Lemma (Single-photon emission round number estimation (Informal)). Let q ≥ 2 be the number of different intensities
honest Alice can use for the decoy states in Protocol II.3. Let {pad1 , . . . , padq } be the (known) probabilities that Alice’s
1 We remind the reader that intensities correspond to the mean number of photons produced by the source. For a (randomized phase)
coherent state the intensity is given by |α|2. In many practical cases the intensity of the source can be chosen.
9source emits a state with (known) intensities {ad1 , ..., adq}. Let ps be the (known) probability that Alice’s source emits
a state with (known) intensity as corresponding to the signal state ( i.e. non-decoy state). Let xi be the observed
number of non-discarded rounds where Alice has prepared a signal of intensity i ∈ {as, ad1 , ..., adq}. Then with high
probability, the number of non-discarded signal rounds nA1 in which Alice’s source has emitted exactly 1 photon is lower-
bounded by LA1, where LA1 is a function of the intensities {as, ad1 , ..., adq}, the probabilities {ps, pad1 , . . . , padq }, and
the observations {xas , xad1 , . . . , xadq }. The analytical expression for LA1 is given in the formal version of the lemma,
Lemma IV.15 in the case q = 2. Its proof is given in Appendix B. For q > 2 one can compute LA1 numerically as
explained in Appendix B.
The above lemma is an essential ingredient to prove the following security theorem.
Theorem (Security of Protocol II.3 (Informal)). Let 0 <  < 1, let l be the length of the committed string, let p
be the probability that – in the preparation phase of an honest execution of Protocol II.3 – a given round i is not
discarded, let eerr be be the expected error rate between the outcomes of honest Alice and honest Bob in the Preparation
phase of the protocol, and let D be a bound on the size of dishonest Bob’s quantum memory measured in qubits.
Protocol II.3 implements an (l, )−Randomized String Commitment as defined in Definition II.1. In particular it
does so using a number N of quantum communication rounds that is linear in l. More precisely N must satisfy
(p −√ln(−1)/2N)N ≥ n? where n? is smallest positive integer solution to (λ − h(δ))n ≥ l + 2 log(1/2) + ln(−1),
λ := f(−D/n) − (γ + αA4 ) − 1/n with n being the length of honest Alice’s string Xn1 produced at the end of the
Preparation phase, αA4 is a term accounting for statistical fluctuations, and δ is a function of the expected error rate
eerr. The exact expression of δ and αA4 are given in the formal version of this theorem: Theorem IV.14.
A formal version of this theorem together with its proof are given in the Methods Section: Theorem IV.14.
In Protocol II.3 and its security analysis we will use the following notations:  ∈]0, 1[, and fas , fbs ∈ [0, 1] are
fractions defined in Step 2 of Protocol II.3. α1, α2 are the same as in Section IIA, and as for the terms βA, βB , αA4 , αB4 ,
they account for statistical fluctuation. They all are O(1/√N) where N is the number of rounds of the protocol.
Their exact expressions are given in Theorem IV.14. As in Protocol II.1, C is an random [n, k, d]-linear code and
Syn : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}n−k is the function that outputs the parity-check syndrome of code C.
In order to satisfy the security definition for Randomized String Commitment (Def. II.1), when the protocol aborts,
the honest parties will continue the protocol as if they were not aborting – in particular they do not announce the
abort event until the end of the protocol – and in the end honest Bob always rejects the commitment and assigns a
uniformly random value to his output C˜l1, and honest Alice assigns a uniformly random value to her output Cl1.
Protocol II.3 (Randomized String Commitment with decoy states).
Inputs: The security parameter  > 0, the parameter γ ∈ [0, 1/2] that essentially measures how good the single
photon sources are, the length l of the string that will be produced by the protocol, the maximum size (expressed in
qubits) of the adversary’s quantum memory D, the expected error rate eerr between Alice’s and Bob’s string XI
and XˆI , the probability distributions (pas , pad1 , . . . , padq ) and (pbs , pb1 , . . . , pbq ) that Alice and Bob use intensities
{as, ad1 , . . . , adq} and {bs, bd1 , . . . , bdq} respectively.
Preparation phase:
Alice and Bob agree on a number N of rounds. N must satisfy (p −√ln(−1)/2N)N ≥ n∗, where n∗ the
smallest positive integer solution to the inequality eq. (37), and where p is the probability that any given
round i ∈ [N ] is not discarded in the preparation phase when both parties are honest.
1. For round i ∈ [N ]:
• Alice chooses Xi ∈R {0, 1} and Θi ∈R {0, 1} uniformly at random, and chooses intensity a ∈
{as, ad1 . . . adq} with some probability distribution pa. Alice prepares a quantum signal of intensity
a, encoding Xi in the basis Θi, and sends it over to the measurement station.
• Bob chooses Xˆi ∈R {0, 1} and Θˆi ∈R {0, 1} uniformly at random, and chooses intensity b ∈
{bs, bd1 . . . bdq} with some probability distribution pb. Bob prepares a quantum signal of intensity
b, encoding Xˆi in the basis Θˆi, and sends it over to the measurement station.
• The measurement station performs a Bell measurement on the two states it receives, and publicly
reveals the outcome, or whether the measurement failed (see RemarkII.1).
2. Alice and Bob publicly announce the intensities they have used for all the rounds i ∈ [N ] (the order
in which this is announced is not important). Alice checks that among the rounds where she has used
intensity as and the measurement succeeded, the fraction fbs of rounds where Bob has used intensity
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bs is higher than pbs − βA. Bob checks that among the rounds where he has used intensity bs and the
measurement succeeded, the fraction fas of rounds where Alice has used intensity as is higher than
pas − βB. If this is not the case, Alice or Bob abort the protocol.
3. Using the decoy states Alice estimates a lower-bound LA1 for nA1 (this is given by Lemma IV.15), the
number of rounds where the Bell measurement has not been announced as a failure and where Alice
emitted 1 photon with intensity as. If UA2fbs (nA1 +nA≥2)
≥ γ + αA4 Alice aborts the protocol.
4. Using the decoy states Bob estimates a lower-bound for nB1 (this is given by Lemma IV.15), the number
of rounds where the Bell measurement has not been announced as a failure and where Bob emitted 1
photon with intensity bs. If UB2fas (nB1 +nB≥2)
≥ γ + αB4 Bob aborts the protocol.
5. Alice and Bob discard all the rounds where a failure has been announced, and where the intensities used
by Alice and Bob are not as and bs. Let’s call the remaining number of rounds n. Alice has strings
Xn1 and Θn1 ∈ {0, 1}n, and Bob has strings Xˆn1 and Θˆn1 ∈ {0, 1}n. Note that n = fbs × (nA1 + nA≥2) =
fas × (nB1 + nB≥2). Alice and Bob check that n ≥ l+2 log(1/2)+ln(
−1)
λ−h(δ) , and otherwise abort the protocol.
6. Both parties wait for a time ∆t.
7. Alice sends Θn1 over to Bob.
8. Bob computes the set I ⊆ [n] of rounds i where Θi = Θˆi. Bob discards all the rounds j /∈ I. Let’s then
call XˆI the string formed by all the remaining bits Xˆi with i ∈ I.
Note that when there is no noise we have that ∀i ∈ I Xi = Xˆi. In practice there are always errors:
We will call eerr the expected errors rate between Xi and Xˆi (for i ∈ I).
Commit Phase:
1. Bob checks whether m := |I| ∈ [1/2 · n− α1, 1/2 · n+ α1]. If this is not the case Bob aborts.
2. Alice chooses a random [n, k, d]-linear code C (for fixed n and k) and computes w = Syn(Xn1 ) and sends
it to Bob.
3. Alice picks a random 2-universal hash function r ∈R R and sends it to Bob.
4. Alice outputs Cl1 := Ext(Xn1 , r) where Ext(·, ·) is a randomness extractor from the 2-universal family
of function.
Open phase:
1. Alice sends Xn1 to Bob.
2. Bob computes its syndrome and checks if it agrees with w he received from Alice in the Commit phase.
If they disagree Bob aborts.
3. Bob checks that the number of rounds i ∈ I where Xn1 and XˆI do not agree lies in the interval
]eerr − α2, eerr + α2[. If not, Bob aborts the protocol, otherwise he outputs Cl1 := Ext(Xn1 , r) where
Ext(·, ·) is a randomness extractor from the 2-universal family of function.
We require that (p−√ln(−1)/2N)N ≥ n?, for n? satisfying (λ− h(δ))n ≥ l + 2 log(1/2) + ln(−1)‡ only to make
sure there are enough rounds to produce l−bits final strings in a secure way. p is the probability that a round is
not discarded in the honest scenario, and it can be expressed a function of the experimental parameters: The round
won’t be discarded if both players sent a signal state for this round, which happens with probability pas × pbs , and
if the measurement station did not reported this round as failure (see Remark II.1) which happens with probability
1− pfail|asbs , so p = pas × pbs × (1− pfail|asbs).
‡ Note that λ and δ implicitly depend on n, therefore one cannot solve the inequality analytically.
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D. OT with an imperfect single photon sources
In this section we will prove that MDI Oblivious Transfer is “not easy” in practical settings. Indeed in practice
photon sources are not perfect i.e. they have some probability p≥2 to emit more than one photon. If now one considers
a protocol containing a preparation phase similar to the one of Protocol II.2, but where now Bob has an imperfect
single photon source, it becomes possible for a malicious Alice to deduce from the states she receives from Bob, some
of the bases Θi that have been used in Bob’s encoding. As we will explain below this is due to the fact that when
more than one photon are emitted by Bob’s source, a dishonest Alice can distinguish states encoded in the standard
and the Hadamard basis, which is not possible to do when a single photon is emitted. This is a leakage of information
that has heavy consequences on the feasibility of an OT protocol as explained below.
We will illustrate how this leakage of information can break security of a protocol, by describing what happens to
Protocol II.2 when Alice is malicious and Bob holds an imperfect single photon source. After this we will generalize
the reasoning.
Dishonest Alice’s end goal is to guess correctly the value of bit C that Bob will get at the end of the protocol.
Moreover, Alice being malicious implies that Alice has full control over the measurement station, and therefore
everything Bob sends to the measurement station can be considered in Alice’s possession. Let us now start with the
preparation phase of Protocol II.2. In this phase of the protocol, Bob sends BB84 states2 to the measurement station,
or equivalently to dishonest Alice. But contrary to section II B Bob now holds an imperfect single photon source.
This means that in some of the rounds, more than one photon are sent to Alice. This becomes a problem because if,
for example, the source has emitted two photons, then the state Alice receives conditioned on Bob preparing it in the
standard basis is 1/2(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|), while if we condition the state on being prepared in the Hadamard basis it
is 1/2(| + +〉〈+ + | + | − −〉〈− − |). These two states are not the equal, and therefore Alice can use these states to
guess the basis Θi that Bob has used to encode the state. When a single photon is used this is not a problem since
1/2(|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|) = 1/2 = 1/2(|+〉〈+| + |−〉〈−|): the two cases – Bob prepares the state in the standard or the
Hadamard basis – are perfectly indistinguishable. Moreover, the more photons are emitted by the source, the easier it
is for Alice to guess correctly which basis Bob has used. To be conservative, for each round in which multiple photons
have been emitted we will consider that malicious Alice knows exactly Bob’s choice of basis Θˆi.
At the end of the preparation phase malicious Alice sends a string Θn1 3 to Bob. Bob uses the string Θn1 he received
from Alice and his own choice of bases described by the string Θˆn1 to compute the set I := {i ∈ [n] : Θi = Θˆi}, which
is the set of rounds in which Bob’s choice of bases matches the value of the bit malicious Alice has sent to him, and
where n denotes the total number of rounds. He also erases all the bits Xˆi he has used to encode the states he has
sent to the station for all i such that i 6∈ I. At this point Bob holds the set I and the string XˆI which is formed by
all the bits Xˆi he has used in the round i ∈ I. Remember that Malicious Alice knows the value of Θˆi in some of the
rounds, and therefore knows whether these rounds correspond to rounds in I or not. We call IG the set of rounds
for which Alice knows that they are in I and IB the set of rounds for which she knows that they are not in I. The
choice bit C that has to be created by the protocol is chosen uniformly at random by Bob. He then uses this bit C to
rename the sets (I, Ic) – where Ic denotes the complement of I – into (IC , I1−C), where C takes value in {0, 1}. In
other words, if Bob chooses C = 0 then (I, Ic) is renamed into (I0, I1), and if he chooses C = 1, (I, Ic) is renamed
into (I1, I0).
After the preparation phase, Bob sends (I0, I1) to (malicious) Alice. Revealing these two sets to Alice does not
reveal in itself the value of bit C. However, there has been a leakage of information in the preparation phase, and
from this leakage Alice knows the set IG and IB defined above, she can compare the two sets IG and IB with the sets
I0 and I1 she has received from Bob. But by definition of IG we must have IG ⊂ I = IC and IG ∩ Ic = ∅. Therefore
she can get the value of C: if IG ⊂ I0 then C = 0, and if IG ⊂ I1 then C = 1. Therefore Protocol II.2 is not secure if
Bob holds an imperfect single photon source.
In the following we will generalize the settings to show that the argument presented above holds for more general
protocols than Protocol II.2. To do so we will abstract the structure of the protocol, as well as the meaning of the
registers (e.g. the registers IG and IB) we use in the attack. The notation will stay very similar to what we have
presented above, and the main intuition behind the attack remains the same. Our impossibility result holds for any
protocol satisfying Assumption II.1.
The statement we will make is expressed in in terms of asymptotic security, i.e. we will say that Alice can cheat
if she has a non-negligible advantage in guessing Bob’s bit C (see Theorem IV.20 below). A function is said to be
2 |Xi〉Θi which correspond to encoding in the basis Θˆi, where Θˆi = 0 corresponds to the standard basis and Θˆi = 1 corresponds to the
Hadamard basis
3 The way Alice chooses the value for Θn1 has no importance, and we will therefore consider Θ
n
1 as a fully random string in this argument.
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negligible (in some variable n) if it is smaller than 1/na (for any a > 0 and for n large enough). Similarly we will say
that a probability p is overwhelmingly large if 1− p is negligible.
In order to generalize the attack on Protocol II.2 we have seen above, we work in a model (see Fig. 5) where Alice
and Bob have already run a quantum phase of a protocol, that has given registers Xn1 to honest Alice and XI , I to
Bob. Xn1 is a bit string and XI is a substring of Xn1 whose bits are the ones corresponding the set of indices I ⊆ [n].
One can typically think of a “quantum phase” as being the preparation phase of Protocols II.2 & II.3 for example.
If Alice is dishonest we assume that she has recorded – during this quantum phase – information leaked by the
imperfection of Bob’s source. We model this leakage of information by giving dishonest Alice two extra registers
(IG, IB) that correspond to two sets of indices correlated with I. When Bob is dishonest we simply assume that he
holds the cq-registers KQ such that his min-entropy on Alice’s string Xn1 is smaller than honest Bob’s one. Since we
work in the bounded storage model we assume log dimQ ≤ D.
After this quantum phase of the protocol, we assume that Alice and Bob perform a classical post-processing. One
such post-processing is the post-processing of Protocol II.2. When a party is dishonest we assume he will in fact
be semi-honest during the post processing, meaning that he will run the post-processing honestly but record all the
information he has received or sent. We prove that if such a protocol is correct and secure against dishonest Bob,
then Protocol II.4 gives dishonest Alice a (semi-honest) strategy to use her extra input registers (IG, IB) she got from
the quantum phase and all the communication she recorded during the post-processing in order to guess honest Bob’s
output bit C with non-negligible advantage.
We will describe the set of messages going from Bob to Alice by the random variable MBA. The messages from
Alice to Bob will be described by the random variable MAB . The random variable composed of these two variables
will be called M . In other words M := (MAB ,MBA).
The output of honest Alice is (S0, S1) := (f0(Xn1 ,M), f1(Xn1 ,M)) ∈ {0, 1}×{0, 1}, where f0 and f1 are two functions
determined by the protocol. Typically, these functions are the composition of error correction with a randomness
extractor. The output of honest Bob is (C, SC) := (g(XI , I,M), g˜(XI , I,M)), where g and g˜ are two other functions
determined be the protocol. These four functions model the operations that honest Alice and Bob have to perform
according to the protocol they are running.
We construct an attack where Alice is semi-honest (or equivalently “honest but curious”), that is, she will execute
the post-processing part of the protocol honestly but keep all the information that she has exchanged with Bob so
that she can in the end compute whatever she is interested in, which in this case is C. Our result holds under two
assumptions stated below. This restricts the applicability of our theorem. However, we argue in the Discussion Section
that these assumptions should still be sufficiently general for many practical settings.
Assumptions II.1 (Informal). In order to prove the theorem below we need two assumptions. Let f0 and f1 be the
functions that map honest Alice’s available information (Xn1 ,M) to her outputs S0 and S1: S0 := f0(Xn1 ,M) & S1 :=
f1(X
n
1 ,M). Let (IG, IB) be the sets of indices that dishonest Alice gets before the execution of the post-processing
procedure due to the imperfection of Bob’s photon source (see Fig. 5).
1. There exists a computable function F than maps (Xn1 ,M) to the pair of sets (I0, I1)4 corresponding to the
positions of the bits of Xn1 on which the functions f0 and f1 depend.
2. There is a non-negligible probability that,
the intersection between the set IG ∪ IB and I0\I1 is not empty
and
the intersection between the set IG ∪ IB and I1\I0 is not empty.
If we define κ being the minimum size of the two intersections above, we can rephrase this condition by saying
that, there is a non-negligible probability that κ ≥ 1.
The sets IG, IB are the sets dishonest Alice gets from the leakage of the quantum part of the protocol. The sets I0, I1
are the sets correlated to set I and bit C that do not reveal value of bit C as long as I is completely unknown from
Alice. Of course since dishonest Alice has extra information IG, IB correlated to I, Alice is not ignorant about I: She
therefore has some information about the bit C, which as we will see allows her to cheat. The reader can find a more
formal version of these assumptions in the Methods Section: Assumption IV.1.
4 Remember that in Protocol II.2 sets (I0, I1) correspond to the renaming of the sets (I, Ic) that Bob sends to Alice
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Figure 5: Schematic view of the classical post-processing between (dishonest) Alice and (dishonest) Bob. Before the
post-processing Alice and Bob have run an unspecified quantum protocol which gave them their inputs:
Xn1 +(IG, IB) for (dishonest) Alice, and (XI , I), or KQ for (dishonest) Bob.
When Alice is dishonest, we will consider that she is “honest but curious” at the post-processing level, meaning that
Alice will run the post-processing honestly with Bob, but she will record all communication MAB ,MBA and use
them at the end together with her extra-input (IG, IB), to extract more information than what she should get out of
the protocol. To do so she will use the strategy described in Protocol II.4
Theorem (Dishonest Alice cheating (Informal)). If a quantum protocol between Alice and Bob that implements OT
is such that it leaks some information (IG, IB) to dishonest Alice in the quantum phase (before the classical post-
processing), and if this protocol is correct and secure against dishonest Bob, then there exists a strategy for dishonest
Alice that allows her to cheat, i.e. she can guess Bob’s bit C with non-negligible advantage. This strategy runs as
follows: Dishonest Alice runs honestly the post processing phase with Bob, but records all messages sent and received
during this post-processing. At the end of the post-processing she will use all this messages together with her extra
information (IG, IB) in order to locally run the procedure described in Protocol II.4. This procedure outputs her guess
for Bob’s bit C.
The reader can find a formal version of this theorem in the Methods Section, together with its proof: Theorem IV.20.
We recall that when Alice is dishonest she holds some extra set IG (and IB), which in a protocol like Protocol II.2
would typically correspond to the multiphoton rounds where dishonest Alice has inferred that Bob has used the same
basis as she did (or a different basis for IB). So at the end of the post-processing she will execute the strategy detailed
in Protocol II.4, where she starts by computing the two sets I0 and I1. She will then choose uniformly at random
– thanks to random bit r – whether she later wants to sample at random an index in S0 := I0\I1 ∩ (IG ∪ IB) or in
S1 := I1\I0 ∩ (IG ∪ IB). At this point Alice samples uniformly at random an index in Sr, and checks whether this
round is in IG or in IB . If it is in IG then Alice’s guess for Bob’s bit C will be r, and otherwise she guesses 1 − r.
More formally Alice proceeds as follows.
Protocol II.4 (Dishonest Alice’s strategy).
Inputs: xn1 ,m, IG, IB.
Outputs: b.
• Alice computes (I0, I1) = F (xn1 ,m), where F is given by Assumptions II.1.
• Alice checks that I0\I1 ∩ (IG ∪ IB) 6= ∅ and I1\I0 ∩ (IG ∪ IB) 6= ∅. If this is not the case Alice outputs
b ∈R {0, 1} uniformly at random, otherwise she continues with the protocol.
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• Alice sample a bit r uniformly at random.
• Alice chooses an index ir ∈ Ir\I1−r ∩ (IG ∪ IB) uniformly at random.
• Alice checks whether ir ∈ IG or ir ∈ IB. If ir ∈ IG then Alice outputs b = r and she outputs b = 1 − r
otherwise.
Alice’s output bit b represents Alice’s guess for the bit C that honest Bob got from the protocol.
Intuitively the sets I0, I1 carry information about the correlations Alice and Bob share at the beginning of the
post-processing, but not about Bob’s final output C. In particular these sets say that if their initial (honest) inputs
are such that Bob knows the bits of Xn1 on positions given by I0 then C = 0, and if he initially knows the bits of Xn1
on positions given by I1 then C = 1. However since honest Alice does not know which bits of Xn1 Bob knows (she is
ignorant about I), it does not say anything about the actual value of Bob’s output C. Dishonest Alice however gets
extra inputs (IG, IB) that precisely gives her information about which are the bits Bob knows. As a consequence by
cross-referencing these two pieces of information dishonest Alice can get some advantage in guessing bit C.
III. DISCUSSION
In the previous section we show that all protocols that satisfy the two assumptions given in Assumptions II.1 (or
more formally Assumption IV.1) cannot be secure against dishonest Alice. We believe that the class of protocols that
satisfy these conditions is general enough to encompass many of the protocols that are currently implementable with
current technology. In this section we argue in this direction.
We first point out that it should not be possible to get a fully general impossibility theorem, since we have shown
that when having a sufficiently good single photon source it is possible to devise a secure protocol (see Theorem
IV.11). As a consequence one can only prove statements about more restrictive classes of protocols. This is what we
have done in the previous section. However we have analyzed these protocols under Assumptions II.1, and it is not
clear how restrictive Assumptions II.1 are.
First, let us spell out some of the implicit assumptions made for our theorem that necessarily limit the range of
its applicability. In the model we use (see Fig. 5), it is clear that the classical post-processing operated by Alice and
Bob runs on bit strings (Xn1 , XI , . . .) and of sets of indices “I, . . .”, however we think that the reasoning used for our
theorem can be extended to more general inputs. In this model, we also only start by looking at the attack directly
at a post-processing part of the protocols. This is convenient since it allows our theorem to be valid for various
quantum implementations that could have run before the post-processing. Of course this assumes that the protocols
end with a fully classical post-processing phase. As a consequence our proof only applies for such protocols. However,
even though these implicit assumptions limit the applicability of our theorem, we believe that this is enough for any
practical implementation.
Let us now go to the core of our assumptions, i.e. let us look at conditions given in Assumptions II.1. The first
assumption is, informally, that there exists a way for dishonest Alice to compute, from Xn1 and M , sets of indices
(I0, I1) that correspond to the positions in the string Xn1 where the functions f0 and f1 are dependent on the value
of the bits located at these positions.
The second assumption can be reformulated as follows. If, for a fraction of rounds, some information is leaked then
there is a non-negligible probability that κ ≥ 1 (see Assumptions II.1).
We now argue that these two condition are not very restrictive.
- Indeed we conjecture that the first assumption should always hold in protocols where the basis choice relates to
Bob’s output C: In order for the protocol to be correct, intuitively the set of messages exchanged in the protocol
represented by the random variable M should contain the information that “tells” the functions f0 and f1 how
they should act on the bits of Xn1 , and on which of these bits they should operate. This suggests that Alice can
also retrieve this information, i.e. compute (I0, I1). We do not give a formal proof of this statement, that is why
it is taken as an assumption. In a protocol like Protocol II.2 it is clear that this condition is satisfied since Bob
explicitly sends the pair (I0, I1) to Alice.
- If the second assumption was not satisfied then – at least intuitively – Bob is able to know (with overwhelming
probability) which rounds leak information (multiphoton emission rounds) and therefore choose the sets I0 and
I1 (or sufficiently influence the protocol) such that κ = 0. But then Bob could effectively get an almost perfect
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Figure 6: Schematic representation of the “Feasibility” of OT and BC depending on the resources/model used in the
protocol. In the first column neither BC nor OT are possible, but since OT can be used in order to get BC but not
the contrary, OT is somewhat a harder problem, which is why it is below BC. When quantum communication are
possible then OT and BC are equivalent (represented at the same level) but still impossible. In the third column we
add the Bounded Storage assumption, which makes both protocol possible. They are still equivalent. In the last
column we add that quantum communication between the parties are made in the MDI settings, and we assume
that the parties do not have perfect single photon source. In this case BC is possible (see Theorem IV.14) but OT is
not (see Theorem IV.20).
(except with negligible probability) single photon source, by preventing any multiphoton emission from leaving
his lab. In a protocol like the ones we have presented in the previous sections, Bob does not know in which
rounds his source has emitted multiple photons, therefore there will be in the end with very high probability
multiphoton rounds that are kept.
For these reasons we believe that our impossibility result applies to most (if not all) currently implementable OT
protocols.
In the presence of quantum communication, it is known that OT and BC are equivalent [BBCS92, FS09], meaning
that from one of these tasks one can build a secure protocol for the other. However the construction used, implicitly
assumes a trusted device setting, and as a consequence this construction does not necessarily prove equivalence between
OT and BC in MDI settings. Since we prove in this work that MDI BC is secure (in the bounded/noisy quantum
storage model), if our impossibility result for OT generalizes, the MDI settings (without a single photon source) would
be the first quantum setting where one can prove security for BC but not for OT with the same adversarial model
(see Fig. 6), i.e. it would be a quantum setting in which OT and BC are not equivalent.
IV. METHODS
In this section we present and prove security statement for the protocols presented in the results sections. We start
by stating theorems and lemmas that will be useful in our proofs. Then we prove security for BC and OT when the
honest players have perfect photon sources. We continue by giving the security proof for BC when the honest parties
only have imperfect single photon sources. We finally prove that a class of protocols cannot be secure for OT when
using imperfect single photon sources.
Remark IV.1. For simplicity, all our statements and proofs are expressed in the Bounded Storage model, but can
easily be extended to the Noisy Storage Model as explained in [BBCW13, RTK+18].
16
A. Useful Lemmas and Theorems
Here, we give useful theorems that we will use as tools for our proofs. Before stating these theorems, we need to
define (smoothed) min-entropies. The “smoothness” of the smooth-min entropy is defined relatively to the purified
distance defined as follows.
Definition IV.1 (see [Tom16]). Let ρ and σ be two non-normalized quantum states. Their purified distance is given
by,
∇(σ, ρ) :=
√
1− F (σ, ρ), (3)
where F is the fidelity defined as,
F (σ, ρ) :=
(
‖√σ√ρ‖1 +
√
(1− tr ρ)(1− trσ)
)2
, (4)
where ‖ · ‖1 is the Schatten 1−norm: If A is a linear operator acting on a finite dimensional Hilbert space, then
‖A‖1 := tr
√
A†A.
We define the ball B(ρ, ) of radius  centered in ρ, as being the set of non-normalized quantum states whose purified
distance to ρ is less or equal to . One can now define the smooth min-entropy.
Definition IV.2. Let ρAB be a quantum state, and let  ≥ 0. The -smoothed min-entropy on A conditioned on B is
defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ := sup
ρˆ∈B(ρ,)
(
− inf
σB
inf{η ∈ R : ρˆ ≤ 2η1A ⊗ σB}
)
, (5)
where σB ranges over the density matrices, and where B(ρ, ) is the ball of radius  centered in ρ. The ( = 0)-smoothed
min-entropy is simply called min-entropy and is denoted Hmin(A|B)ρ.
Theorem IV.1 (Leftover Hash Lemma with smooth min-entropy [Ren05, TL17]). Let ρAn1E be a classical-quantum
state and let Ext(·, ·) : {0, 1}n ×R 7→ {0, 1}l be an extractor based on a 2-universal family of hash functions R from
{0, 1}n to {0, 1}l, that maps the classical n-bit string An1 into KA. Then
‖ρKARE − τKA ⊗ ρRE‖1 ≤ 2−
1
2 (H

min(A
n
1 |E)ρ−l) + 2, (6)
where τ denotes the maximally mixed state, and ‖ · ‖1 is the Schatten 1-norm.
We will use many times a chain rule on min-entropy stating that a conditioning quantum register cannot decrease
the entropy more than by its size expressed in qubits.
Theorem IV.2 (min-entropy chain rule ([Ren05]). Let ρXKQ be a classical on XK, and  ≥ 0. Then we have
Hmin(X|KQ) ≥ Hmin(X|K)− log dim(Q). (7)
Using the ideas from [KWW12, NJC+12] we will use random codes to prove the security of Bit Commitment. We
give here one useful property of these random codes, which can be viewed as a tradeoff between the minimal distance
d of the code and its rate R.
Theorem IV.3 ([Gal62]). For a randomly generated [n, k, d] binary linear code with rate R := k/n, the minimum
distance d satisfies,
Pr(d ≤ δn) ≤ 2(R−Cδ)n, for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, (8)
where Cδ := 1− h(δ), h(x) := −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary entropy, and where the probability is taken
uniformly over all the codes with fixed parameters k and n.
The following min-entropy splitting lemma intuitively states that for a classical distribution PX0X1Z , if the min-
entropy (conditioned on Z) on (X0, X1) is large then it must be the case that the random variable X1−C has high
min-entropy too, where C is a binary random variable.
17
Lemma IV.4 (Min-entropy splitting [Wul07, DFR+07]). Let X0, X1, Z be three random variables with distribution
PX0X1Z . Let 1 >  > 0. If
Hmin(X0X1|Z) ≥ K, (9)
then there exists a binary random variable C such that,
H4min(X1−C |CZ) ≥ K/2− 1 + 2 log(1−
√
1− 2). (10)
Very often we will use a concentration bound called the Hoeffding inequality.
Theorem IV.5 (Hoeffding inequality [Hoe63]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be n identically and independently distributed random
variables. If ∀i ∈ [n], a ≤ Xi ≤ b, Then
Pr
(
1
n
∑
i
Xi − E
(
1
n
∑
i
Xi
)
≥ t
)
≤ exp
(
− 2t
2n
(b− a)2
)
(11)
and (12)
Pr
(
E
(
1
n
∑
i
Xi
)
− 1
n
∑
i
Xi ≥ t
)
≤ exp
(
− 2t
2n
(b− a)2
)
. (13)
As a consequence, by taking t =
√
(b−a)2 ln −1
2n for some  ∈]0, 1[, we get,
Pr
(
1
n
∑
i
Xi − E
(
1
n
∑
i
Xi
)
≥
√
(b−a)2 ln −1
2n
)
≤  (14)
and (15)
Pr
(
E
(
1
n
∑
i
Xi
)
− 1
n
∑
i
Xi ≥
√
(b−a)2 ln −1
2n
)
≤ . (16)
B. Bit Commitment (BC) with perfect single photon sources
In this section we present the security proof for Protocol II.1 which implements BC when honest parties have
perfect single photon sources. In particular we prove Theorem IV.6 below. The security proof is mostly the same
as in [NJC+12, KWW12], the only differences are that in our Protocol II.1 we are guaranteed that the sources emit
single photons, so we do not need to care about multiphoton emissions, and that because we want the security to hold
even in the presence of noise, we adapt the simulator argument of [KWW12]. More over we use a more recent lower
bound [DFW15] on the min-entropy.
Theorem IV.6 (Security of Protocol II.1). Let  > 0 be a security parameter, eerr ∈ [0, 1/2[ is the expected error
rate of the protocol II.1, and let l ∈ N, l > 0 be the length of the string we want to commit. Let us call n the
number of quantum communication rounds in which the measurement station has clicked in Protocol II.1, and let
α2 :=
√
ln −1
2(1/2−α1)n , α1 :=
√
ln −1
2n which account for statistical fluctuations. Let Q be dishonest Bob’s quantum
register, K his classical register, and D be such that log dim(Q) ≤ D. Let C be a randomly generated-[n, k, d] linear
code with fixed n and k and rate R := k/n. We choose the rate of code C to be R = ln()/n + 1 − h(δ), where
δ := 2eerr + 2α2. Let λ := f(−D/n)− 1/n be a lower-bound on the -smooth min-entropy rate of honest Alice’s string
Xn1 conditioned on (malicious) Bobs information KQ, where f is defined in eq. (18).
If n satisfies5,
(λ− h(δ))n ≥ l + 2 log(1/2) + ln(−1), (17)
then Protocol II.1 implements a (l, 3)−Randomized String Commitment.
5 Since δ and λ implicitly depend on n, one cannot analytically solve the inequality.
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Proof. When the two parties are honest and conditioned on not aborting, one can check that the protocol is correct.
When the two parties are honest, they can abort in two places. Either they abort in the first step of the Commit
phase or in the third phase of the Open phase. In the first case Bob aborts if |I < 1/2n−α1|. By the definition of α1
and the Hoeffding inequality (see Theorem IV.5), this happens with probability at most . Similarly in step 3 of the
Open phase Bob aborts the protocol if he observes an error rate that does not lie in the interval [eerr − α2, eerr + α2],
which by Hoeffding inequality happens with probability at most 2. Putting this two potential abort events together,
the honest parties have a probability at most 3 to abort, which proves correctness.
Lemma IV.8 proves that Protocol II.1 is 3-hiding.
Lemma IV.10 together with Theorem IV.3 show that Protocol II.1 is 2−binding.
In the following with will prove Lemmas IV.8 and IV.10, which state security for honest Alice and for honest Bob
respectively.
Security for Alice: When Bob is dishonest we will assume that he controls the measurement station, therefore
we treat the measurement station and Bob as one single party (Fig. 2b). Note that this reduces to the trusted
device scenario in which Bob is dishonest [KWW12, DFW15, NJC+12]. As a consequence several results from
Refs. [DFW15, NJC+12] can be reused here.
In fact, the situation in this section is even simpler in the sense that we consider that the honest party (Alice) has
access to a perfect single photon source. This, together with the fact that we use a lower bound [DFW15] on the min-
entropy that does not depend on the specifics of the state but only on the structure of Alice’s measurements, prevents
Bob from gaining any advantage by (selectively) discarding rounds. We discuss this in more details in Appendix A.
Let f(·) be the following function.
f(x) :=

0 if x < −1
g−1(x) if − 1 ≤ x < 1/2
x if 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1,
(18)
where g(x) := h(x) + x− 1 and h(x) := −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary entropy.
Lemma IV.7 (from [DFW15]). Let  ≥ 0. If Alice is honest, and Bob has a bounded quantum memory Q (his
quantum register Q has dimension at most 2D) then at the end of the preparation phase, the smooth min-entropy of
Bob on Alice string is
Hmin(X
n
1 |QK)ρ ≥ λn, (19)
where λ = f(−D/n)− 1/n− log(2/2)/n, and K is Bob’s classical register.
Since in the protocol Alice sends the syndrome of her string Xn1 to Bob, we need this syndrome to be sufficiently
small in order to keep the entropy relatively high so that the protocol is secure against dishonest Bob. On the other
hand, we need the distance of the code to be sufficiently large in order to tolerate errors that might occur between
honest Alice and honest Bob. As in Ref. [NJC+12] we use a random code: They have sufficiently small syndrome with
high distance for our purpose, and since the honest party are not using any decoding we do not need an efficiently
decodable code.
Lemma IV.8 (Security against Dishonest Bob, similar as in Ref. [NJC+12]). Let  ∈]0, 1[. Let Q be Bob’s quantum
memory such that log dim(Q) ≤ D. Let C be a random [n, k, d]-linear code with rate R := k/n. If n satisfies
λ− 1 +R > 0
and,
n ≥ l+2 log(1/2)λ−1+R .
(20)
If Alice is honest, then the protocol is 3-hiding.
Proof. Using Lemma IV.7 we obtain that after the Commit phase, Bob’s entropy on Alice’s string Xn1 is,
Hmin(X
n
1 |QKSyn(Xn1 ))ρ ≥ (λ− 1 +R)n, (21)
where R is the rate of the code C, i.e., and the length of the syndrome being n − k = (1 − R)n. This together with
the leftover hash Lemma IV.1 leads us to
ρCl1,QKSyn(Xn1 ) ≈′ τCl1 ⊗ ρQKSyn(Xn1 ), (22)
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where τCl1 is the maximally mixed state on C
l
1, and
′ = 2+
1
2
2−
1
2 (H

min(X
n
1 |QKSyn(Xn1 ))−l). (23)
If λ−1+R > 0, then by choosing n sufficiently large we can have ′ ≤ 3, meaning that Protocol II.1 is 3-hiding.
Security for Bob:
Figure 7 tells us that the protocol where it is dishonest Alice that sends half of an EPR pair to Bob produces the
exact same state as Protocol II.1 when Alice is dishonest. We can therefore adapt the analysis of [KWW12] to the
presence of noise similarly to the analysis performed in [WCSL10], which leads us to the following lemma.
Lemma IV.9 (Similar to Theorem III.5 of [KWW12] and [WCSL10]). If Bob is honest, then at the end of the
preparation phase, there exists an ideal state σAX¯n1 I between (dishonest) Alice and Bob such that:
• σAX¯n1 I = σAX¯n1 ⊗ τI
• ρAB = σA(X¯II),
where τI is the maximally mixed state on I, ρAB is the real state produced by the protocol between (dishonest) Alice
and Bob, and where the registers (A,B) are identified with (A, X¯II).
Proof (Sketch). We will place ourselves in the virtual scenario of Figure 7 where Alice sends the states to Bob. Here,
contrary to [KWW12] we want to take care of the noise that might affect the quantum signal and measurements,
therefore the simulator introduced in Ref. [KWW12] has to be slightly modified.
In order to prove the existence of an ideal state σ, in Ref. [KWW12] the authors introduce a virtual protocol where
a simulator lies between dishonest Alice and honest Bob. This simulator will measure the states sent from Alice to
Bob, thus creating the register X¯n1 and then send an “honest” state to Bob. Then they show that the ideal state σ
created by this virtual protocol satisfies the two relations of Lemma IV.9 with the real state ρ of the real protocol.
In our case Fig. 7 tells us that the noise will only be on the half of the EPR pair kept by Alice, and that the
qubit sent to Bob is not affected by any noise. Therefore if the simulator measures it and re-encodes it honestly (and
without noise) a qubit corresponding to its outcome and choice of measurement basis, the two relations of this lemma
will be satisfied.
From here on, reusing the argument in Refs. [KWW12, NJC+12] we get the final statement for Bob’s security.
Lemma IV.10. Let  > 0. Let C be an [n, k, d]-code with minimum distance d that satisfies,
d ≥ 2(eerr + 2α2)n ∼
n→∞ 2eerrn, (24)
with α2 :=
√
ln −1
2(1/2−α1)n , α1 :=
√
ln −1
2n , then Protocol II.1 either aborts before the open phase or is -binding according
to definition C.1. Note that the protocol specifies what the honest parties have to do when aborting. What they do
during an abort event enforces security definition C.1 to be also satisfied when the protocol aborts.
Proof. We again follow the reasoning from [KWW12, NJC+12]. According to Lemma IV.9 there exists a random
variable X¯n1 , such that Bob knows X¯I and I. Now if Alice wants to cheat she needs to send to Bob a string Xn1 6= X¯n1
such that Syn(Xn1 ) = w which implies that dH(X¯n1 , Xn1 ) ≥ d/2 (see [KWW12, Lemma IV.4]), where dH(·) is the
hamming distance. Therefore Alice has to flip at least d/2 bits from X¯n1 in such a way that dH(X¯I , XI) ≤ (eerr+α2)m.
However Alice is ignorant about which bits Bob knows. As a consequence the situation is equivalent to where I is
chosen after that Alice has chosen which bits she wanted to flip. This is a sampling problem, which means that we
can use Hoeffding’s inequality (see Theorem IV.5) to estimate the number W of bits in I that Alice will flip:
Pr
(
W ≤ m(d/2n− α2)
) ≤ exp(−mα22) ≤ exp
(
−m
√
ln −1
2m
2)
≤ . (25)
Therefore if,
d ≥ 2(eerr + 2α2)n (26)
⇒ m(d/2n− α2) ≥ (eerr + α2)m (27)
then by using eqs. (25) and (27) we get Pr(W < (eerr +α2)m) ≤  meaning that Alice’s attempt in cheating is detected
(and Bob will not accept) with probability ≥ 1− .
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Figure 7: When honest Bob has access to a single photon source and Alice is dishonest, the three situations depicted
are equivalent: In the first Bob chooses the bases Θˆn1 and Xˆn1 uniformly at random, and sends a BB84 type state, as
described in Protocol II.1. The second picture depicts the equivalent scenario where he sends half of an EPR pair to
Alice, and gets Xˆ and Θˆ by measuring the other half. This scenario itself is equivalent to the last fictitious scenario
where it is dishonest Alice who sends half of the EPR pair. Note that in the last fictitious scenario, sending EPR
pairs might not be the optimal cheating strategy for dishonest Alice, but it is the one that makes this fictitious
scenario equivalent to the real scenario represented in the first picture. If some noise acts on the qubit sent by Bob
to Alice in the first scenario, this can be seen as Alice applying a noise map on the half of the EPR pair she keeps
before applying a measurement in the third scenario. In this virtual scenario, the other half of the EPR pair is
assumed to be sent (measured) to (by) Bob without any noise.
C. Oblivious Transfer (OT) with perfect single photon sources
In this section we present and prove Theorem IV.11 stating security for Protocol II.2 which implements a Random-
ized Oblivious String Transfer when the honest parties have access to single photon sources. The security proof closely
follows the security proofs from [ENG+14, KWW12]. Indeed the main difference in our case is simply to show that
security of our protocol can be reduced to the security of [ENG+14]. This is the case because when Bob is dishonest,
he controls the measurement station so we are in a situation where Alice sends BB84 states to dishonest Bob, which is
exactly the same situation as in [ENG+14], and therefore the security immediately follows from [ENG+14] when Bob
is dishonest. When Alice is dishonest we use the fact that sources emit single photons together with a purification
argument in order to reduce the security of our protocol to the one of [ENG+14].
Theorem IV.11. Let  > 0 and let l = |S0| = |S1|, and α1 :=
√
ln −1
2n . If the number of n of quantum communication
rounds in which the measurement station has clicked satisfies condition (28), then the Protocol II.2 implements an
1-out-2 Randomized (l, 8)−Oblivious String Transfer (see Def. C.2).
Proof. Let’s first check correctness with honest Alice and honest Bob. Note that conditioned on not aborting the
protocol is −correct. Indeed the only case where the protocol is not correct conditioned on not aborting is when the
error correction procedure fails to correct Bob’s string which happens with probability at most . We then prove that
when both parties are honest, the protocol aborts with probability at most 2. Indeed an abort event happens either
if |I| < m which happens with probability at most , or if the error correction procedure aborts which happens with
probability at most . As a consequence the protocol aborts with probability at most 2, and since conditioned on
not aborting it is −correct, it implies that overall the protocol is 3−correct.
According to Lemma IV.12, the protocol is 8−secure for honest Alice.
According to Lemma IV.13, the protocol is ( = 0)−secure for honest Bob.
In the following we state and prove Lemmas IV.12 and IV.13 which state security for honest Alice and for Honest
Bob respectively.
Security for Alice: Since the preparation phase of Protocols II.1 and II.2 are the same, we will use similar bounds
as in Lemma IV.7 [KWW12] to lower bound the entropy on Xn1 . However we will not use the exact same bounds
because we afterwards want to use the min-entropy splitting lemma that is valid only on purely classical states. As a
consequence we will first use a chain rule (Theorem IV.2) to get rid of Bob’s quantum memory and then lower bound
the entropy.
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Lemma IV.12. Let Bob be dishonest with a bounded quantum memory denoted Q such that log dim(Q) ≤ D for
some D. Let l := |S0| = |S1| be the length of the two strings S0 and S1. If
n ≥ 2 l +D + 1− 2 log(1−
√
1− 2)
λ− leakO − 2α1 (28)
where leakO := |O| is the size of the error correction information Alice sends to Bob, then Protocol II.2 is 8-secure
for Alice, with λ = 1/2− 2δ′, δ′ = (2− log(√(32 ln −1)/n))√(32 ln −1)/n [KWW12, eq. (19)].
Proof. Protocol II.2 is designed in such a way that it is sufficient to prove that there exists a binary random variable
C such that the entropy Hmin(XI1−C |KQCO) at the end of the preparation phase is sufficiently high. Indeed after
the preparation phase Alice and Bob will use a randomness extractor on XI0 and on XI1 , meaning that if the above
mentioned entropy is high enough then Bob will be ignorant of at least one of the two “extracted” strings, which is what
we want from the security definition. In order to bound this entropy, we will start by bounding Hmin(XI0XI1 |KO)
where the quantum register Q is not used, and we will reintroduce it later using a min-entropy chain rule (Theorem
IV.2).
Note that Xn1 = XIXIBadXremaining = XI0XI1Xremaining. By definition of I and IBad, we have that |Xremaining| =
n− 2m = 2α1n. Therefore
Hmin(XI0XI1 |KO) = Hmin(XIXIBad |KO) ≥ Hmin(Xn1 |KO)− 2α1n. (29)
By using the previous bound together with the min-entropy splitting lemma (Lemma IV.4), we get that there exists
a binary random variable C such that,
H4min(XI1−C |KOC) ≥ (Hmin(Xn1 |KO)− 2α1n)/2− 1 + 2 log(1−
√
1− 2). (30)
Using the min-entropy chain rule (Theorem IV.2) on the register Q (|Q| ≤ D) and combining it with eq. (30) we
conclude that
H4min(XI1−C |KCOQ) ≥ H4min(XI1−C |KOC)− |Q| (31)
≥ (Hmin(Xn1 |KO)− 2α1n)/2− 1 + 2 log(1−
√
1− 2)−D, (32)
where C is defined by the use of the min-entropy splitting lemma in eq. (30).
We will now again use the chain rule (Theorem IV.2) to get rid of the register O, and we will call leakO := |O| the
maximum leakage due to error correction, and we get
Hmin(X
n
1 |KO) ≥ Hmin(Xn1 |K)− leakO. (33)
inserting this into the previous inequality gives,
H4min(XI1−C |KCOQ) ≥ (Hmin(Xn1 |K)− leakO − 2α1n)/2− 1 + 2 log(1−
√
1− 2)−D. (34)
The amount of error correction information leakO sent during the protocol can be predetermined by considering the
necessary amount of error correction information the parties need when they are both honest, i.e. when both parties
(and the measurement station) act in an identically and independently distributed (IID) and trusted manner, and
where all the errors come from an i.d.d. noise – an “honest noise”. Indeed if the parties are honest – and if leakO is
sufficiently large – they will be able to correct their string with probability (≥ 1− ), making the protocol correct. If
Bob is not honest, since the amount of error correction information is fixed, then the leakage of information is also
fixed no matter what strategy he uses. The question is now, how large is “sufficiently large” to allow honest Alice and
Bob to correct their string with high probability? This question has been answered in Refs.[RW05, TSSR11] where it
is shown that one can take
leakO = H

max(XI0 |XˆI0C = 0)ρhonest +Hmax(XI1 |XˆI1C = 1)ρhonest = 2Hmax(XI0 |XˆI0C = 0)ρhonest ,
where the entropies are evaluated on the state ρhonest produced by the protocol when both parties are honest.
One can then lower-bound Hmin(X
n
1 |K) using [KWW12, eq. (19)] (see also [NBW12]),
Hmin(X
n
1 |K) ≥ λn,
with λ = 1/2 − 2δ, δ = (2 − log(√(32 ln −1)/n))√(32 ln −1)/n. Since Hmax(XI0 |XˆI0C = 0)ρhonest is evaluated
on honest i.i.d parties we can upper-bound the max-entropy using the equipartition Theorem [TCR09], getting
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2Hmax(XI0 |XˆI0C = 0)ρhonest ≤ 2h(eerr)n/2 +O(
√
n) = h(eerr)n+O(
√
n) where eerr is the error rate between Alice’s
string XI0 and Bob’s string XˆI0 .
Using (34) and the fact that S1−C := Ext(XI1−C , r1−C) we can invoke the leftover hash lemma IV.1 to get that,
ρSCQS1−C ≈8 σSCQC ⊗ τS1−C , (35)
where τS1−C denotes the maximally mixed state on S1−C .
Security for Bob: Once again the preparation phase is the same as for Protocol II.1, therefore we also use Lemma
IV.9 to show that the protocol is secure for Bob. Intuitively this is true because at the end of the preparation phase,
Alice is ignorant about I, and after that no information about C is leaked.
Lemma IV.13. If Bob is honest, then Protocol II.2 satisfies the security definition for Bob.
Proof (Informal). Since the ideal state satisfies σAX¯n1 I = σAX¯n1 ⊗ τI and that the only information sent from Bob
to Alice is (I0, I1), there is no leakage on the value of C, therefore Alice remains ignorant about C. In other words
the state σA′S0S1C created by applying Protocol II.2 (with dishonest Alice) on the ideal state σAX¯n1 I , satisfies the
condition σA′S0S1C = σA′S0S1 ⊗ τC .
Also since from Lemma IV.9 σA(XII) = ρA(XII) and that the same operations are applied in the ideal and real
scenario (on the registers AXII) we get that σA′SCC = ρA′SCC .
D. Bit Commitment with an imperfect single photon sources
In this section we present security proof for Protocol II.3 which implements String Commitment when honest
parties have imperfect single photon sources. In particular we prove Theorem IV.14 below. The proof is essentially
the same as for Theorem IV.6, but of course since we are now dealing with imperfect single photon sources, we need
to be more careful the rounds where the honest party sends multiple photons. Indeed in this case the malicious party
could try to selectively discard the rounds where he receives less information, typically the single photon rounds, and
only keep the rounds that might leak some information, the multiphoton rounds. To prevent that we add decoy states
in the preparation phase, which will allow the honest party to check how many multiphoton rounds are kept at the
end of the preparation phase as compare to the single photon rounds. If to many multiphoton rounds are kept at the
end of the preparation phase, the honest party aborts the protocol.
Theorem IV.14. Let , ε, εˆ, 1 be as defined in Lemma IV.15, and let γ, eerr ∈ [0, 1/2[. The values of the parameters
γ and eerr can be chosen by estimating the parameters honest devices. Let N be the total number of quantum com-
munication rounds of the preparation phase of Protocol II.3, let nHk be the number of these rounds in which party H’s
source (H ∈ {Alice,Bob}) has produced k photons and in which the measurement station has clicked, and let n be the
number of communication rounds that are not discarded at the end of the preparation phase. Let α2 :=
√
ln −1
2(1/2−α1)n ,
α1 :=
√
ln −1
2n , α
′′
1 :=
√
ln −1
2(1−γ−αB4 )n
, α′1 := min
[
1/2 ;
α1+(1−γ−αB4 )α′′1
γ+αB4
]
, α3 :=
√
ln −1
2n
[
1/2−α′′1−(1/2+α′1)(γ+αB4 )
] . Let
βA :=
√
ln(1/)/(2(nA1 + n
A
≥2)), we will assume that β
A ≤ pbs/2,
βB :=
√
ln(1/)/(2(nB1 + n
B
≥2)), we will assume that β
B ≤ pas/2,
αA4 := (2/pbs + 1/fbs)β
A,
αB4 := (2/pas + 1/fas)β
B .
Let C be a randomly generated [n, k, d] (with fixed n and k) linear code with rate R := k/n. We choose this code
such that the rate R = ln ()/n + 1 − h(δ), where δ := 2
[
(1/2 + α′1)(γ + α
B
4 ) + α3 +
(eerr+α2)(1/2+α1)
(1/2−α′1)(1−γ−αB4 )
]
. Let Q be
Bob’s quantum register, and let D be such that log dim(Q) ≤ D. Let λ := f(−D/n) − (γ + αA4 ) − 1/n lower-bound
the -smooth min-entropy rate (Hmin(X
n
1 |QK)ρ)/n except with probability 16(+ ε+ εˆ) + 81 , where f is defined in
eq. (44).
If the single photon sources used by honest parties are sufficiently good, i.e.
p≥2|as/(1− p0|as) ≤ pbsγ,
and
p≥2|bs/(1− p0|bs) ≤ pasγ,
(36)
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and if (p−√ln(−1)/2N)N ≥ n∗, where n∗ the smallest positive integer solution to the following inequality6,
n ≥ l + 2 log(1/2) + ln(
−1)
λ− h(δ) , (37)
and where p is the probability that a round i ∈ [N ] is not discarded in the preparation phase when both parties are
honest, then Protocol II.3 implements a
(
l, 9+ 32(+ ε+ εˆ) + 161
)−1-out-2-Randomized String Commitment.
Proof. Let’s start with correctness. First of all note that conditioned on not aborting the protocol is correct. We now
show that when both parties are honest the protocols aborts with probability smaller than 9+ 32(+ ε+ εˆ) + 161,
which implies that the protocol is (9+ 32( + ε + εˆ) + 161)−correct. Using the Hoeffding inequality (see Theorem
IV.5) it is easy to check that the honest parties will abort with probability at most 2 at step 2 of the preparation
phase.
If the two parties are honest with sources such that p≥2|as/(1−p0|as) ≤ pbsγ (for Alice) and p≥2|bs/(1−p0|bs) ≤ pasγ
(for Bob), then the probability to abort at step 3 is at most + 16(+ ε+ εˆ) + 81 and at most + 16(+ ε+ εˆ) + 81
at step 4. Indeed in step 3, using the Hoeffding inequality one can check that with probability at most , we have
nA≥2
nA1 +n
A
≥2
≤ pbsγ + βA. By dividing the expression by fbs and using that conditioned on not aborting in the previous
steps fbs ≥ pbs − βA we get
nA≥2
fbs (n
A
1 +n
A
≥2)
≤ pbspbs−βa + 1/fbsβ
A. Using that except with probability 16(+ ε+ εˆ) + 81
we have UA2 ≥ nA≥2 and that for 1/pbsβA ≤ 1/2 we have 1/(1− 1/pbsβA) ≤ 1 + 2/pbsβA we get the desired result. An
analog proof holds for step 4. Again by the Hoeffding inequality, there is a probability at most  to abort at step 5.
Using again the Hoeffding inequality one can check that Bob will abort the protocol with probability at most 2
at step 1 of the Commit phase and with probability at most 2 at phase 3 of the open phase. Over all the protocol
aborts with probability at most 9+ 32(+ ε+ εˆ) + 161.
Security for honest Alice is given in Lemma IV.17. Security for honest Bob is given in Lemma IV.19.
Before proving security for honest Alice (Lemma IV.17) and for honest Bob (Lemma IV.19), we need to prove
that the honest party H ∈ {Alice,Bob} can always find a lower-bound LH1 on nH1 , the number rounds where H has
emitted a single photon and has sent a “signal” state. This is what the following lemma shows. You can find its proof
in Appendix B.
Lemma IV.15. Let xio,θ be the “observed” number of rounds where H has prepared a signal of intensity i in the basis
θ and where the measurement station (or the dishonest party) reported outcome o 6=failure. Let , 1 > 0, and ε, εˆ such
that ∀(o, θ), (2ε−1)1/ζo,θ,L ≤ exp(3/(4√2))2 and (εˆ−1)1/ζo,θ,L < exp(1/3), with ζo,θ,L := xio,θ −
√∑
i x
i
o,θ/2 ln(1/).
Let ∆i,o,θ := g(xio,θ, ε
4/16), ∆ˆi,o,θ := g(xio,θ, εˆ
3/2), and g(x, y) :=
√
2x ln(y−1). Then if q = 2 (q is the number of
decoy states used during the protocol i.e. i ∈ {is, id1 , id2}) we have,
nH1 ≥ LH1 :=
∑
o,θ
[
pis|k=1 |S1,o,θ|min − g(pis|k=1 |S1,o,θ|min, 1)
]
(38)
except with probability 16(+ ε+ εˆ) + 81, where |S1,o,θ|min is given by,
|S1,o,θ|min := min(V1, V2, V3, V4), (39)
with
V1 =
pid1 |k≥2(x
id2
o,θ + ∆id2 ,o,θ)− pid2 |k≥2(x
id1
o,θ + ∆id1 ,o,θ)
pid1 |k=1pid2 |k≥2 − pid1 |k≥2pid2 |k=1
(40)
V2 =
pid1 |k≥2(x
id2
o,θ − ∆ˆid2 ,o,θ)− pid2 |k≥2(x
id1
o,θ + ∆id1 ,o,θ)
pid1 |k=1pid2 |k≥2 − pid1 |k≥2pid2 |k=1
(41)
V3 =
pid1 |k≥2(x
id2
o,θ + ∆id2 ,o,θ)− pid2 |k≥2(x
id1
o,θ − ∆ˆid1 ,o,θ)
pid1 |k=1pid2 |k≥2 − pid1 |k≥2pid2 |k=1
(42)
V4 =
pid1 |k≥2(x
id2
o,θ − ∆ˆid2 ,o,θ)− pid2 |k≥2(x
id1
o,θ − ∆ˆid1 ,o,θ)
pid1 |k=1pid2 |k≥2 − pid1 |k≥2pid2 |k=1
. (43)
One can compute tighter bounds using more decoy states (i.e. for q > 2). For more details see Appendix B.
6 Remember that the parameters like λ, δ etc. depend on n
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For simplicity we will, in the following, continue the security analysis for the case where q = 2. The above lemma
will allow us to prove the following security lemmas: Lemma IV.17 proves security for honest Alice, and Lemma IV.19
proves security for honest Bob.
Security for Alice: When Alice is honest almost nothing changes except that Bob’s entropy about Alice’s string
is smaller by roughly γn bits. As a consequence lemma IV.7 has to be changed.
Let f(·) be the following function.
f(x) :=

0 if x < −1
g−1(x) if − 1 ≤ x < 1/2
x if 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1,
(44)
where g(x) := h(x) + x− 1 and h(x) := −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary entropy.
Lemma IV.16. Let , ε, εˆ, 1 be as defined in lemma IV.15. If Alice is honest (but uses a non-perfect photon source),
and Bob has a bounded quantum memory Q (his quantum register Q has dimension at most D) then at the end of the
preparation phase, and if Alice did not abort, the smooth min-entropy of Bob on Alice string is,
Hmin(X
n
1 |QK)ρ ≥ λn (45)
with probability higher than 1− 16(+ ε+ εˆ)− 81, where λ := f(−D/n)− (γ +αA4 )− 1/n [DFW15], and K is Bob’s
classical register.
Here we have used that – as proven in Theorem IV.15 – with probability higher than 1−16(+ε+ εˆ)−81 dishonest
Bob gets at most (γ + αA4 )n extra bits of information due to the leakage information on the bases used by Alice.
We can then reuse Lemma IV.8 with the only difference that we have to include the probability that Alice emits 2
or more photons in more than (γ + αA4 )n “non-failure” rounds.
Lemma IV.17 (Security against Dishonest Bob). Let , ε, εˆ, 1 be as defined in Lemma IV.15. Let Q be Bob’s
quantum memory such that dim(Q) ≤ D, and the rate R of the code C be such that,
n ≥ l + 2 log(1/2)
λ− 1 +R . (46)
If Alice is honest, then Protocol II.3 (with q = 2) either aborts or is [3+ 16(+ ε+ εˆ) + 81]-hiding. Note that when
the honest Alice aborts she is required to output uniformly random strings, so that the security definition C.1 is also
satisfied when the protocol aborts. In fact when aborting the ideal and the real state are equal.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as in Lemma IV.8, except that we add 16(+ε+ εˆ)+81 to the failure probability,
which corresponds to the probability that there are more than (γ + αA4 )n rounds where at least 2 photons have been
emitted (see Theorem IV.15), and where λ has value given by Lemma IV.16.
Security for Bob:
We will start by stating a lemma similar to Lemma IV.9, adapted to the case of an imperfect single photon source.
Lemma IV.18. When Bob is honest, at the end of the preparation phase, there exist a state σX¯n1 AI such that
• σX¯n1 AI = σAX¯n1 I′ ⊗ τI′′
• ρAB = σA(X¯II),
where τ denotes the maximally mixed state, I ′ is the register encoding the set of rounds where Alice got extra infor-
mation from the emission of multiple photons, and I ′′ is the register encoding the set of rounds in I where Alice did
not get any information. Formally the registers I ′ and I ′′ are such that I ′⊗ I ′′ = I. ρAB is the real state produced by
the protocol between (dishonest) Alice and Bob, and where the registers (A,B) are identified with (A, X¯II).
In the following we will use the same reasoning as in Lemma IV.10, adapting it to the case where the multiphoton
emissions are possible.
Intuitively when Bob is honest but uses a non-perfect single photon source dishonest Alice basically knows, for a
fraction γ of the rounds, whether they belong to I or not. Using similar notations as in Lemma IV.10, this knowledge
will help dishonest Alice when she will have to flip d/2 bits from X¯n1 . Indeed she can flip the ≈ (γ/2)n bits that she
knows not to be in I. For the ≈ d/2− (γ/2)n remaining bits, she will flip bits that are not the ≈ (γ/2)n she knows
to be in I.
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Lemma IV.19 (see [NJC+12]). Let , ε, εˆ, 1 be as defined in Lemma IV.15. Let α1, α2 be the same as in Lemma
IV.10, and αB4 as defined in Protocol II.3. Let α′′1 :=
√
ln −1
2(1−γ−αB4 )n
,
α′1 := min
[
1/2 ;
α1+(1−γ−αB4 )α′′1
γ+αB4
]
, α3 :=
√
ln −1
2n
[
1/2−α′′1−(1/2+α′1)(γ+αB4 )
] . Let C be an [n, k, d]-code with minimum
distance d that satisfies,
d ≥ 2
[
(1/2 + α′1)(γ + α
B
4 ) + α3 +
(eerr + α2)(1/2 + α1)
(1/2− α′1)(1− γ − αB4 )
]
n ∼
n→∞
(
γ +
2eerr
1− γ
)
n. (47)
Then when Bob is honest, Protocol II.1 either aborts or is [ + 16( + ε + εˆ) + 81]-binding according to definition
C.1. Since when honest Bob aborts he is required to reject the opening and output a random string C˜l1, the security
definition is automatically satisfied when honest Bob aborts the protocol.
Proof (Sketch). From Lemma IV.15 we know that except with probability 16( + ε + εˆ) + 81, dishonest Alice gets
information on at most (γ + αB4 )n bits.
Except with probability , at most a fraction (1/2 + α′1) of them are not in I, so Alice can flip them without Bob
being able to detect this. We can compute this fraction by noticing that on rounds where 1 photon has been emitted
(there are at least (1−γ−αB4 )n of them), the probability of each of these rounds to be in I is 1/2 and is independent
of Alice’s information. Therefore, by Hoeffding inequality (see Theorem IV.5), the number of these rounds being in
I should be ≤ 1/2 +α′′1 , except with probability . Moreover, if the protocol does not abort then the total number of
rounds in I is m ≤ (1/2 + α1)n. Combining this with the fact that 1/2 + α′1 ≤ 1 gives the expression for α′1.
At least d/2 − (1/2 + α′1)(γ + αB4 )n bits remains for Alice to flip. However she knows that she should flip these
remaining bits on the position on which she did not get any information during the preparation phase. There are
≥ (1 − γ − αB4 )n such positions. Therefore Alice’s choice of bit flip is equivalent to uniformly sampling without
replacement d/2− (1/2 +α′1)(γ+αB4 )n positions out of ≥ (1− γ−αB4 )n to estimate the number W of bits that Alice
chooses to flip while being in a position in the set I. As for Lemma IV.10 this is equivalent to first fixing Alice’s
bit flip and then choosing the position that are in I among the (1 − γ − αB4 )n available positions. Using Hoeffding
inequality we get that,
Pr
(
W < n
[
1/2− α′′1 − (1/2 + α′1)(γ + αB4 )
]
(d/2n− (1/2 + α′1)(γ + αB4 )− α3)
)
(48)
≤ exp (− 2n[1/2− α′′1 − (1/2 + α′1)(γ + αB4 )]α23) = . (49)
Now if
d ≥ 2
[
(1/2 + α′1)(γ + α
B
4 ) + α3 +
(eerr + α2)(1/2 + α1)
(1/2− α′1)(1− γ − αB4 )
]
n, (50)
then with probability ≥ 1− − 16(+ ε+ εˆ)− 81,
W ≥ n[1/2− α′′1 − (1/2 + α′1)(γ + αB4 )](d/2n− (1/2 + α′1)(γ + αB4 )− α3) (51)
≥ (eerr + α2)(1/2 + α1)n ≥ (eerr + α2)m. (52)
This means that if eq. (50) is satisfied there is a probability at most + 16(+ ε+ εˆ) + 81 that Alice can cheat and
make Bob accept.
E. OT with an imperfect single photon source
In this section we state more formally our impossibility result for a secure Oblivious Transfer protocol. In particular
we show that if a protocol satisfy Assumption IV.1, then Protocol II.4 allows dishonest Alice to cheat.
1. Informal description of the settings
We recall that dishonest Alice’s goal is to guess correctly the bit C that is given to honest Bob by the protocol
(the protocol gives him an random bit C and a bit string SC). In section IID we already give a simple example on
how an attack could work on a protocol like Protocol II.2. Here we explain informally what is the general form of
the protocols to which our impossibility result applies. In the next section we will make this setup definition more
precise. Our impossibility result applies to protocols of the following form.
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First phase: In a first phase, called the quantum phase, Alice and Bob can used classical and quantum communica-
tion. This phase outputs string Xn1 to Alice and a string XI and set of indices I to Bob, where XI is a string
formed by the bits of the string Xn1 that are placed at indices in I. In order to model the leakage of information
due to the multiphoton emissions (see section IID) we assume that Alice receives two extra sets of indices IG
and IB . This two sets are correlated to the set I. In particular we will consider elements of IG are more likely
to belong to I than elements in IB . In the simple example of Section IID, dishonest Alice could compute these
sets from the leakage information concerning the bases Bob has used in this phase. Moreover, in this specific
example we had that IG ⊆ I and IG ⊆ Ic, where Ic is the complement of I.
Second phase: The second phase of the protocol is purely classical, that is they only send classical messages. Alice
and Bob should use the data they got from the first phase in order to compute the desired strings (S0, S1) and
bit C that the OT protocol should produce (see Definition II.2).
Note that we don’t specify the specific form for the first phase, we simply require that it outputs the strings Xn1 ,
XI and the set I with some probability distribution, as well as the extra sets IG and IB when Alice is dishonest.
The strategy we use to break security of MDI OT protocols is a semi-honest strategy. This means that Alice will
essentially run the protocol honestly7 but record all the information from the communication between her and Bob.
In particular, in the quantum phase Alice extracts – from the quantum signal Bob sends to the measurement station –
information about set IG and IB before applying the measurement that the station should normally apply. Of course
our attack rely on the fact that the set IG and IB are sufficiently large so that Alice gets enough statistics to have
a good guess of Bob’s bit C. In other words we need that Bob’s photon source leaks enough information. This is
captured in the second equation of eq. (53) in Assumptions IV.1.
After this quantum phase, we assume that Alice and Bob can post process the data they received from the quantum
phase, by using purely classical communication. Since we assume that dishonest Alice is semi-honest, we will assume
that she runs the post-processing honestly but records all the information she receives from, or sends to Bob.
In the post-processing of Protocol II.2 Bob chooses uniformly at random the bit C, and then renames the sets I
and Ic into I0 and I1 in such a way that I = IC . Bob then sends (I0, I1) to Alice. The information (I0, I1) sent by
Bob to Alice, should not by itself reveal bit C. But because Alice holds the extra sets IG and IB , she can determine
which set from (I0, I1) corresponds to set I, and therefore she learns the value of bit C. In the general settings, we
will only assume that from all the information Alice has she can compute two sets I0 and I1 such that IC ⊆ I and
I1−C 6⊆ I. This is the second assumption in Assumptions IV.1.
In the following sections, we describe in details how we generalize this idea of attack to a more general settings.
2. Settings Definition
In this section we defined the settings in which our theorem holds. Theorem IV.20, states that any protocol that
has the form we describe below, and that is correct, and secure against Bob, can be attacked by dishonest Alice. That
is, it is always possible for Alice to correctly guess Bob’ bit C with sufficiently high probability. Dishonest Alice’s
cheating strategy in is given in Protocol II.3. In order to generalize the discussion of Section IVE1, all the random
variables mentioned in Section IVE1, Xn1 , I, I0, I1, C, . . . will be redefined in a more abstract manner.
In order to prove our result we will forget about the quantum part of the OT protocol, and start directly in a
scenario, in which Alice and Bob share from the start the type of correlation they would have had by running a
preparation phase similar to Protocol II.2.
In particular we will assume that the Preparation phase gives the following to Alice and Bob:
Honest Alice: Alice gets a random bit string Xn1 with probability distribution PXn1 .
Honest Bob: Bob gets a random subset I ⊆ [n] with probability distribution PI , and the string XI , whose bits are
the bits of Xn1 that are indexed by i ∈ I.
When one of the parties is dishonest we will assume they have the following additional information as input:
Dishonest Alice: Dishonest Alice gets the same Xn1 as when she was honest, plus the sets IG, IB ⊆ [n], which are
sets of indices satisfying the following:
IG ∩ IB = ∅ and |IG ∪ IB | = γn for some γ ∈]0, 1[.
∀i ∈ IG ∪ IB
7 She still has full control over the measurement station. In particular everything that Bob sends to the measurement station is considered
to be in dishonest Alice’s possession.
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- If i ∈ I then i ∈ IG with probability 1/2(1 + µ) or i ∈ IB with probability 1/2(1− µ).
- If i /∈ I then i ∈ IG with probability 1/2(1− µ) or i ∈ IB with probability 1/2(1 + µ).
γ represents the faction of rounds in which more than two photons have been emitted (we should have γ ≈
p≥2/(1 − p0), the probability that more than two photons are emitted when at least one is emitted). µ ∈]0, 1]
models Alice’s probability of guessing Bob’s basis conditioned on receiving several photons from Bob.
Note that this definition can be seen as first giving IG ∪ IB to Alice and then giving her IG and IB through the
probabilistic process described above.
Dishonest Bob: When Bob is dishonest we will assume that he holds a classical register K and a quantum register
Q such that his min-entropy rate Hmin(X
n
1 |KQ)
n is smaller than the one of honest Bob.
Let MBA be the random variable that describes the set of the messages sent from Bob to Alice, and MAB be the
random variable that describes the messages sent from Alice to Bob. The random variable composed of these two
variables will be called M , in other words M := (MAB ,MBA).
The output of honest Alice is (S0, S1) := (f0(Xn1 ,M), f1(Xn1 ,M)) ∈ {0, 1}l × {0, 1}l, where f0 and f1 are two
functions. The output of honest Bob is (C, SC) := (g(XI , I,M), g˜(XI , I,M)), where g and g˜ are two other functions.
These four functions model the operations that honest Alice and Bob have to perform according to the protocol they
are running.
Before estimating Alice’s cheating probability (see Theorem IV.20), we will need the following definition.
Definition IV.3. Let J ⊆ [n] be a set of indices. Let f0, f1 be the functions defined above. We will say that J
stabilizes a function fa (a ∈ {0, 1}) with respect to (w.r.t.) random string Xn1 and random variable M when the value
(xn1 ,m) of random variable (Xn1 ,M) is such that J stabilizes fa w.r.t. xn1 and m. We will say that J stabilizes the
function fa w.r.t. xn1 and m if xJc 7→ fa((xJc , xJ),m) is constant for all xJc s.t. Pr
(
(Xn1 ,M) = ((xJc , xJ),m)
) 6= 0,
where (xJc , xJ) denotes the string composed of the bits xJ of and xJc at the positions corresponding to the sets J and
Jc.
Intuitively this definition captures the notion of a function f depending only on the values of the bits of Xn1 at
positions indexed by the set J ⊆ [n].
3. Assumptions and main Theorem
In this section we state the assumptions we make to prove our theorem and prove Theorem IV.20. Since we assume
Alice is semi-honest her cheating strategy consists in making her guess on Bob’s bit C using all the information she
has collected during the protocol. Therefore we can consider that her cheating strategy is an algorithm she runs at
the end of the protocol on all her data. The cheating strategy we use is described in Protocol II.4. The basic idea of
the protocol is the following. At the end of the protocol Alice has the two sets I0 and I1 that are correlated to bit
C and set I in the following way. If C = 0 then I0 ⊆ I and I1 6⊆ I. If C = 1 the situation is reversed (see previous
section)8. In themselves, these sets do not reveal the value of bit C since Alice should not know anything about set
I. However, since there has been information leakage during the protocol, she does know something about set I. She
knows that indices in IG are more likely to belong to I than the ones in IB , and this allows her to guess with some
probability which set I0 or I1 is a subset of I, and therefore it allows her to guess the value of bit C. Let us state
more precisely the assumptions we use to prove Theorem IV.20.
Let PF be the following statement: “∃F (·, ·) such that F (Xn1 ,M) =: (I0, I1) where I0, I1 ⊆ [n] are such that
IC stabilizes fC but not f1−C (w.r.t. (Xn1 ,M)), and I1−C stabilizes f1−C but not fC (w.r.t. (Xn1 ,M))”, where
C := g(Xn1 , I,M).”
If PF is true then one can define α ∈]0, 1] such that |I1−C\IC ∩ (IG ∪ IB) ∩ I| = (1 − α)|I1−C\IC ∩ (IG ∪ IB)|,
i.e. α is the fraction of rounds in I1−C\IC ∩ (IG ∪ IB) that are not in I.
Assumptions IV.1. Let I0, I1, C,M,Xn1 , I, IG, IB , α, and µ be as defined above. Let δ ∈]0, 1/2]. Let κ :=
min
(∣∣I0\I1 ∩ (IG ∪ IB)∣∣; ∣∣I1\I0 ∩ (IG ∪ IB)∣∣). Let Ωκ be the event: “κ ≥ 1”. We assume in Theorem IV.20
that: PF is true,
Pr(Ωκ) is non-negligible in n,
(53)
8 They have to be correlated to C in this way for the OT protocol to be correct, and secure against dishonest Bob.
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Now we can state and prove our theorem that shows that Protocol II.4 is a strategy that allows dishonest Alice to
to cheat.
Theorem IV.20. Let I0, I1, C,M,Xn1 , I, IG, IB , α, and µ be as defined above. Let δ ∈]0, 1/2]. Let κ := min
(∣∣I0\I1 ∩
(IG ∪ IB)
∣∣; ∣∣I1\I0 ∩ (IG ∪ IB)∣∣). Let Ωκ be the event: “κ ≥ 1”. Let Pguess be the maximum probability that Alice
correctly guesses Bob’s bit C.
If Assumptions IV.1 are satisfied by the protocol run between Alice and Bob, and if this protocol is correct, and
secure against dishonest Bob, then dishonest Alice’s strategy presented in Protocol II.4 allows Alice to guess C with
probability Pguess = 1/2 + adv, where adv satisfies
adv ≥ Pr
(
Ωκ
)
× αµ. (54)
We can also prove that α ≥ 1/n, which is not negligible in n.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem we will lower bound Alice’s guessing probability Pguess, for a protocol satisfying
Assumptions IV.1. In particular we want to show that Pguess is larger than 1/2 by a non-negligible amount. Before
doing that let us spell out important consequences of a protocol being correct and secure against Bob.
Because we assume that PF is true, the sets (I0, I1) := F (Xn1 ,M) are well defined. In order to get correctness we
should have that IC ⊆ I, and for having security against Bob it is necessary that I1−C * I, where C is the bit held
by honest Bob that Alice tries to guess. Let us call b the bit that corresponds to dishonest Alice’s guess of Bob’s bit
C. We can then write,
Pguess = Pr(b = C) = Pr(Ωκ) Pr(b = C|Ωκ) + (1− Pr(Ωκ)) Pr(b = C|¬Ωκ), (55)
≥ Pr(Ωκ) Pr(b = C|Ωκ) + (1− Pr(Ωκ))1/2. (56)
From Assumptions IV.1 we have that Pr(Ωκ) is not negligible. Intuitively, saying that Pr(Ωκ) is not negligible
ensures that there has been information leakage during the quantum phase of the protocol. If Pr(Ωκ) were negligible
we already know by Theorem IV.11 that a protocol like Protocol II.2 would be secure. As a consequence, we will
focus on computing Pr(b = C|Ωκ).
In Protocol II.4, Alice chose uniformly at random an index ir ∈ Ir|I1−r ∩ (IG ∪ IB) and check whether ir ends up
in IG or IB . The idea is that if r = C the probability that ir ends up in IG is slightly higher than the one of ending
up in IB . If r = 1− C it biased towards ending up in IB . Therefore, if she outputs b = r when ir ∈ IG, and outputs
b = 1− r if ir ∈ IB she will have a probability of guessing correctly bit C slightly higher than 1/2, which is what we
are trying to prove.
Note that the event Ωκ depends on the “value” of the set IG ∪ IB , but is completely independent on how IG ∪ IB
is partitioned into the sets IG and IB . In particular the probability for a round in IG ∪ IB to be in IG is independent
of Ωκ.
Let us now write Alice’s guessing probability conditioned on Ωκ, with r and ir as defined by Protocol II.4:
Pguess|Ωκ = Pr(b = C|Ωκ) (57)
= Pr(r = C|Ωκ) Pr(ir ∈ IG|r = C,Ωκ) + Pr(r = 1− C|Ωκ) Pr(ir ∈ IB |r = 1− C,Ωκ), (58)
where r is a uniformly random bit chosen by Alice in Protocol II.4. As a consequence, Pr(r = C|Ωκ) = Pr(r =
1− C|Ωκ) = 1/2. From the definition of IG and IB , and their independence from Ωκ we get that,
Pr(ir ∈ IG|r = C,Ωκ) = Pr(ir ∈ IG|r = C) = 1/2(1 + µ), (59)
Pr(ir ∈ IB |r = 1− C,Ωκ) = Pr(ir ∈ IB |r = 1− C) = 1− 1/2α(1− µ)− 1/2(1− α)(1 + µ). (60)
Plugging this into the expression for Pguess|Ωκ we get that:
Pguess|Ωκ = 1/2
(
1/2(1 + µ) + 1− 1/2α(1− µ)− 1/2(1− α)(1 + µ)) = 1/2(1 + αµ). (61)
As expected the probability that Alice correctly guesses the value of bit C is a bit higher than 1/2.
Combining this with the fact that κ ≥ 1 is true with probability Pr(Ωκ) leads to eq. (54). That is, Alice’s overall
probability of guessing correctly bit C is still slightly higher than 1/2, namely it is higher than,
1/2 + Pr(Ωκ)× αµ.
As we stated earlier I1−C * I, meaning that at least one index in I1−C is not in I, and since I1−C\IC ∩ (IG ∪ IB)
cannot be larger than the total length of the string Xn1 (which is obviously n), we must have α ≥ 1/n.
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Appendix A: Why doesn’t dishonest Bob get any advantage by selectively discarding rounds when Alice uses
a perfect single photon source?
In this section we explain why for our proof we can consider that we can simply evaluate the min-entropy bound of
Lemma IV.7 as if Bob were honest in choosing which rounds he announces to be lost. In other words we explain why
dishonest Bob can’t get any advantage by selectively discarding rounds.
In Protocol II.1, Alice sends n′ BB84 states to Bob using a perfect single photon source. This, by purification of
the states she sends, is equivalent as to Alice preparing n′ EPR pairs, and sending half of each pairs to dishonest Bob,
and randomly measuring her halfs of EPR pairs in the X or Z basis. This allows us to delay Alice’s measurements to
the end of the preparation phase.
The bound we use for the min-entropy is independent of the details of the state. Indeed the bound works as follows.
For any state ρAnE (for some n ∈ N), if Alice’s measurements (modeled by the CPTP mapMAn1 7→Xn1 ) on the systems
An1 (outputting bit string Xn1 ) satisfy some condition (that is indeed satisfied when Alice randomly measures in the
X or Z basis [DFW15]), then Hmin(X
n
1 |E)M(ρ) ≥ B(Hmin(An1 |E)ρ/n) · n, where B(·) is some function that bounds
the min-entropy rate.
Since the bounds applies to any state, one can then choose ρAn1E to be the state of the protocol after that Bob
(holding register E = KQ, where K is classical and Q is the quantum state in his memory) has stored quantum
information and after he has announced which rounds are kept and which are not, but before Alice has measured.
Using the bounded storage assumption (log dim(Q) ≤ D) we can bound Hmin(An1 |E)ρ ≥ −D. This leads us to
Hmin(X
n
1 |E)M(ρ) ≥ B(−D/n) ·n as stated in Lemma IV.7. Note that this bound is evaluated on the state conditioned
on Bob keeping some particular rounds, but the bound does not depend on the strategy he uses for choosing which
rounds he keeps and which he discards.
For Protocol II.2 the same reasoning apply. Indeed even though we use a different bound, the bound we use is also
independent of the details states on which the entropy is evaluated.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma IV.15
In this section we will explain how the honest party H ∈ {A,B} can use the decoy states in order to estimate a
lower-bound LH1 on nH1 . To do so we will use techniques inspired by [CXC+14]. In the following we will detail the
analysis considering that Alice is honest. The case when Bob is honest follows the same structure.
First we can observe that Protocol II.3 is equivalent to a virtual protocol where Alice first chooses the number k of
photons she is sending according to a probability distribution pk, and the encoding basis with probability pθ, and only
after the station reveals the measurement outcome o she chooses the signal intensity a ∈ {as, ad1 . . . adq} according to
probability distribution pa|k (this choice in independent from θ and outcome o). The probability distribution pk and
pa|k in the virtual protocol can be deduced from the distribution pa, and pk|a of Protocol II.3 via Bayes’ rule.
As a consequence for any set SAk,o,θ of rounds where Alice has emitted k photons encoded in the basis θ (θ = 0
for the standard basis, and θ = 1 for the Hadamard basis) and the measurement station (or dishonest Bob) reported
measurement outcome o (with o 6= failure), each subset of SAk,o,θ corresponding to intensity a can be seen as a random
sample of SAk,o,θ. Therefore we can use (classical) random sampling theory to estimate LA1, like Chernoff’s bound for
example. In particular we will use the following lemma proven in Ref. [CXC+14],
Lemma B.1. Let X1, . . . , Xn be n independent Bernoulli random variables such that Pr(Xi = 1) = pi, and let
X :=
∑
iXi and ζ := E(X) =
∑
i pi. Let x be the observed outcome of X for a certain trial and Γ := x−
√
n/2 ln(1/)
for a certain  > 0. If ε, εˆ > 0 are such that (2ε−1)1/ζL ≤ exp(3/(4√2))2 and (εˆ−1)1/ζL < exp(1/3) then x satisfies,
x = ζ + δ, (B1)
except with probability +ε+ εˆ, where δ ∈ [−∆, ∆ˆ], with ∆ := g(x, ε4/16), ∆ˆ := g(x, εˆ3/2) and g(x, y) := √2x ln(y−1).
Here ε(εˆ) denotes the probability that x < ζ −∆ (x > ζ + ∆ˆ).
This lemma is a variation of the Chernoff’s bound, where the bounds on the fluctuations ∆(∆ˆ) do not depend
on the expectation value ζ := E(X) of the random variableX, but only on the observed value x ofX (and the epsilons).
Let SAk,o,θ be the set of rounds as defined above, and let X
a
i|k,o,θ be 1 if the i
th element of SAk,o,θ corresponds to an
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emission of a state (from honest Alice) with intensity a, and 0 otherwise. Let
Xao,θ =
∑
k
|SAk,o,θ|∑
i=1
XAi|o,k,θ, (B2)
with ζao,θ := E(Xao,θ) =
∑
k pa|k |SAk,o,θ|. Let xao,θ be an observed outcome of Xaθ,o. Then applying Lemma B.1 we have
that for some (2ε−1)1/Γ
a
o,θ ≤ exp(3/(4√2))2, (εˆ−1)1/Γao,θ < exp(1/3) with
Γao,θ = x
a
o,θ −
√∑
a
xao,θ/2 ln(1/), (B3)
the following must be satisfied:
xao,θ =
∑
k
pa|k|SAk,o,θ|+ δa,o,θ, (B4)
except with probability + ε+ εˆ, where δa,o,θ ∈ [∆a,o,θ, ∆ˆa,o,θ], with ∆a,o,θ = g(xao,θ, ε4/16) and ∆ˆa,o,θ = g(xao,θ, εˆ3/2).
Since nA1 =
∑
o,θ n
A
1|o,θ it is enough to find a lower bound on n
A
1|o,θ for all values of (o, θ) in order to find a lower
bound LA1 on nA1 . Then using concentration bounds one can write that for each value of (o, θ)
nA1|o,θ ≥ pas|k=1|SA1,o,θ| − g(pas|k=1|SA1,o,θ|, 1), (B5)
except with probability 1. For a fixed value of (o, θ) one can find a lower-bound on |SA1,o,θ| by minimizing |SA1,o,θ|
under the constraints given by eq. (B4). This can be solved by using linear programming [Van14], or we can use
a simplified version of this reasoning to find analytical (but looser) bounds. This is what we will be doing in the
following section.
1. Simple Analytical Bound
In this section we propose to find a simple analytical bound on nA1 , using the reasoning and methods of the previous
section. To do so we will minimize |SA1,o,θ| for a fixed value for (o, θ). Moreover we will restrict ourselves to the use of
only 2 decoy states and one signal state, i.e. a ∈ {as, ad1 , ad2}.
In the previous section we have split the rounds into many sets Sk,o,θ (1 set for each value of k). Here we split the
round into two sets SA1,o,θ and S
A
≥2,o,θ.
With this in mind we can rewrite equation (B4) as the following system of inequalities,
x
ad1
o,θ + ∆ad1 ,o,θ ≥ pad1 |k=1 · |SA1,o,θ|+ pad1 |k≥2 · |SA≥2,o,θ|
x
ad1
o,θ − ∆ˆad1 ,o,θ ≤ pad1 |k=1 · |SA1,o,θ|+ pad1 |k≥2 · |SA≥2,o,θ|
x
ad2
o,θ + ∆ad2 ,o,θ ≥ pad2 |k=1 · |SA1,o,θ|+ pad2 |k≥2 · |SA≥2,o,θ|
x
ad2
o,θ − ∆ˆad2 ,o,θ ≤ pad2 |k=1 · |SA1,o,θ|+ pad2 |k≥2 · |SA≥2,o,θ|
(B6)
Each of the four inequalities represents half a space delimited by a straight line in R2. The two first inequalities
define a region delimited by two parallel lines, and the two last inequalities define another region delimited by two
other parallel lines. The set of four inequalities is then the intersection of these two regions, see Fig. 8. Since we
are optimizing a linear function with linear constraints the minimum is reached for one of the extreme points of this
region. Each of these points corresponds to the solution of the system of equations formed by two of the inequalities
from (B6) (one for decoy state 1 and one for decoy state 2) by changing symbols ≤,≥ into =. Since there are two
equations for each decoy state, the number of extreme points must be 4. They can be found analytically by solving
this system of equations. In the end the lower-bound LA1 is given by,
LA1 =
∑
o,θ
[
pas|k=1 |S1,o,θ|min − g(pas|k=1 |S1,o,θ|min, 1)
]
, (B7)
where |S1,o,θ|min is given by,
|S1,o,θ|min = min(V1, V2, V3, V4), (B8)
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|SA1,o,θ|
|SA≥2,o,θ|
p1
p2
p3 p4
Figure 8: Each of the line is defined by one of the four inequalities in (B6). The red region is the set of points that
satisfies the four linear constraints from (B6). Since we are optimizing a linear function with linear constraints, by
linear programming we know that the optimum is reached for one of the four extreme points p1, p2, p3, p4, which are
at the intersection of the lines. In the particular case of this figure min |SA1,o,θ| is reached in p3.
with
V1 =
pad1 |k≥2(x
ad2
o,θ + ∆ad2 ,o,θ)− pad2 |k≥2(x
ad1
o,θ + ∆ad1 ,o,θ)
pad1 |k=1pad2 |k≥2 − pad1 |k≥2pad2 |k=1
(B9)
V2 =
pad1 |k≥2(x
ad2
o,θ − ∆ˆad2 ,o,θ)− pad2 |k≥2(x
ad1
o,θ + ∆ad1 ,o,θ)
pad1 |k=1pad2 |k≥2 − pad1 |k≥2pad2 |k=1
(B10)
V3 =
pad1 |k≥2(x
ad2
o,θ + ∆ad2 ,o,θ)− pad2 |k≥2(x
ad1
o,θ − ∆ˆad1 ,o,θ)
pad1 |k=1pad2 |k≥2 − pad1 |k≥2pad2 |k=1
(B11)
V4 =
pad1 |k≥2(x
ad2
o,θ − ∆ˆad2 ,o,θ)− pad2 |k≥2(x
ad1
o,θ − ∆ˆad1 ,o,θ)
pad1 |k=1pad2 |k≥2 − pad1 |k≥2pad2 |k=1
. (B12)
Appendix C: Formal Security Definitions for OT and BC
In this section you can find the formal definitions for Randomized String Commitment and for Randomized 1-out-2
(l, )-Oblivious String Transfer. These definitions come directly from Refs. [KWW12].
Remark C.1 (on the abort events). The careful reader will see that the definitions below do not mention any abort
event. In fact our protocols specify the action a party has to take when he wants to abort. In particular we ask the
aborting party to output uniformly random outcomes, so that even when aborting the security definitions are satisfied.
Definition C.1 (Randomized String Commitment). Let τR denote the maximally mixed state on a register R.
An (l, )-Randomized String commitment scheme is a protocol between Alice and Bob that satisfies the following
three properties.
Correctness: When both parties are honest, then there exists a state σCl1Cl1F , called the ideal state that is defined as:
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• σCl1F := τCl1 ⊗ |accept〉〈accept|F ,
• The real state produced by the protocol ρCl1C˜l1F is -close to the ideal state σCl1Cl1F ,
ρCl1C˜l1F
≈ σCl1Cl1F .
Security for Alice (against dishonest Bob): When Alice is honest, Bob is ignorant about Cl1 before the Open
phase:
ρCl1B ≈ τCl1 ⊗ ρB .
The protocol is then said to be -hiding.
Security for Bob (against dishonest Alice): After the Commit phase and before the Open phase, there exists an
ideal state σCl1AB such that for any Open algorithm, describe by the CPTP maps OAB, in which Bob is honest,
we have:
• Bob almost never accepts C˜l1 6= Cl1:
for (1Cl1 ⊗OAB)(σCl1AB) we have Pr(C˜l1 6= Cl1and F = accept) ≤ .
• The real state produced by the commitment phase is close to the ideal state:
ρAB ≈ σAB .
The protocol is then said to be -binding.
Definition C.2 (Randomized 1-out-2 (l, )-Oblivious String Transfer (OST)).
Let τR denote the maximally mixed state on register R.
A fully randomized 1-out-2 (l, )-Oblivious String Transfer scheme is a protocol between two parties, Alice and Bob,
that satisfies the following three conditions.
Correctness: If both parties are honest there exists an ideal state σS0S1CSC , where S1, S1 ∈ {0, 1}l and C ∈ {0, 1},
such that:
• The distribution over S0, S1 and C is uniform:
σS0S1C = τS0 ⊗ τS1 ⊗ τC (C1)
• The real state ρ produced by the protocol is -close to the ideal state:
ρS0S1CSˆC ≈ σS0S1CSC (C2)
Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, there exists an ideal state σAS0S1C such that:
• Alice is ignorant about C:
σAS0S1C = σAS0S1 ⊗ τC . (C3)
• The real state ρ produced by the protocol is close to the ideal state:
ρACSˆC ≈ σACSC (C4)
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, there exists an ideal state σS0S1BC such that:
• Bob is ignorant about S1−C :
σS0S1BC = σSCBC ⊗ τS1−C . (C5)
• The real state ρ is close to the ideal state:
ρS0S1B ≈ σS0S1B . (C6)
